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MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:

Nancy

RE:

December 2, 1977

No. 76-1662, U.S. v. Board of Comm'rs

(~)

I have read Justice Brennan's opinion.

In general,

it is a fine opinion and I have no doubt that it is correct.
Ultimately, I think you should join.
In the meantime, however, and before you join, I
think certain problems should be worked out.

I can communi-

cate the minor suggestions, some of which are noted in the
margins, to Dave Carpenter.
noted in the margins,

~

xa

My major objections also are

although not explained fully.

The biggest problem, and one that is critical, is the text
at 14-19.

The basis point, as I have scribbled on the back

of p. 14, is that when a state or a political subdivision
is covered, every unit within that state or political
).-

-

subdivision is covered, and must comply with the preclearance
~---- ....,

requirements of

,.__,

§

5.

This is true whether the designated

unit is the state or the political subdivision.
an entire state is designated, each

~~

political subdivision

within it and each other political unit within
covered.

Thus if

iRR

it is

The legislative history makes clear that when a

state is designated, every political subdivision within it

2.

is covered.

Since the political subdivision itself has not
~ot>S t/btS/
been designated, and since it
n ot conduct registration,
it is apparent that its qualification as a "political
subdivision" for designation purposes is .tke:xxa:ma: irrelevant
~

to its coverage x once the whole state is designated, there
is no reason for treating a city or other political unit
differently from a political subdivision for coverage
purposes.
The opinion goes through five pages of analysis on
this point, with emphasis on the theme of coverage of
covera~e of
terrmtories within a designated area rather than/ unctional

.

political
units
...
........

that could be designated, in order to

rebut what was going to be JPS' position in dissent.

Dave

Carpenter tells me that JPS was going to argue .tka:.t -designated,
if I have this straight-- that when a whole state is/£sxe:xe:~
the only units

that are covered are political subdivisions.
purposes with the relevant unit for
This theory confuses the relevant unit for designation/~
coverage purposes.

I gather, however, that JPS has

abandoned this position.

Thus the opinion's lengthy

treatment of the theory is unnecessary, and confusing without
the presence of a dissent that takes that position.
The point still could be made, but I think it should
be shortened and made clearer.
out completely.

Dave would rather take it

I would like to consider it further over

the weekend and then either propose a substitution for you
or see whether the section is changed or omitted in the next
circulated draft.
Nancy

.§u:pumt <!Jaurt af t4t ~ni:ttb .§tatt£>
~aa!p:ngtan.lO.

<!J. :Wg7J1.2

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

December 1, 1977

Re:

No. 76-1662 - United States v. Board of
Commissioners of Sheffield

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference

..

I

.iuprtutt Qf!turl llf Urt 'Jinittb ~bdtg
Jfag!ringhm. ~. <q. 2llgtJl.~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 2, 1977

Re:

76-1662

u.s.

v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield

Dear Bill:
In due course, a dissent will be forthcoming on
behalf of Bill Rehnquist, John and yours truly.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.$>upumt <!}lllttt of ±4.t '!.'lttittlt ~t"ltt.$.
Jll~ulft"ingtcn. ~.

<If.

20'giJ~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 1, 1977

Re: No. 76-1662, United States v. Sheffield
Board of Comm'rs.
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.§tt:Vrtmt <!fcu.rt of tqt 'Pitfub ~tafts
1Uasftington. In. <!f. 20,5't~
CHAMBERS OF

November 30, 1977

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

V

Re: No. 76-1662, United States v. Board of Commissioners of
Sheffield, Alabama

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

<!fottrl of tlp~ ~mult ~g
~trrulltittgtctt. 18. <q:. 2.(1~)1~

.§up-uuw

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE H/\RRY A. BLACKM UN

Rochester, Minnesota
Dec embe r 12, 1977

Re:

No. 76-1662

U.S. v. Board of Commissioners
of Sheffield, Alabama

Dear Bill:
Please JOln me . I am writing a two-sentence concurrence which will be around shortly.
Because, however, of my solemn pledge to Henry
Putzel, jr., and because of my compact with the shade of Noah
Webster , my joinder is expressly conditioned upon the elimination of 11 th a t w ord 11 in the 8th line of note 26 on page 25. As
they have always said out here in Bloomer , Wisconsin , 11 parameter don 1t mean boundary . 11 Please?
Sincerely,

H. A. B .

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

The Conference

~~6.U
lv/JAJ
1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm
No. 76-1662
) On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
Board of Commissioners of Shefthe Northern District of
field, Alabama, et al., Appellees.
Alabama.
United States, Appellant,

v.

'[January -, 1978]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
Given the Court's reading of the Voting Rights Act in prior
decisions, and particularly in Allen v. State Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544 (1969), and Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379
(1971), I concur in the judgment of the Court. In addition,
I concur in Part III of the Court's opinion.
Although my reservations as to the constitutionality of the
Act have not abated,-x· I believe today's decision to be correct
under this Court's precedents and necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, as construed in Allen and
Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense
to limit the preclearance requirement to ~ political units
charged with voter registration. As the majority observes,
ante, at 13, such a construction of the statute could enable
covered States or political subdivisions to delegate responsibility for changing the electoral process to local entities that
do not conduct voter registration. A covered State or political subdivision thereby could achieve through its instrumentalities what it could not rio itself without preclearance.
I agree with the Court that a more sensible construction of
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose. is to
treat the governmental units responsible for changes in the
·x·soc Allen v. State Board of Elections. supra, at 595 (Black, J .. dissenting) ; Georgia v. U.S. , 411 U.S: 526, 545 (1973) (PowELL, J., dissenting), :

,

.

76-1662-CONCUR (A)
2

UNITED STATES v. SHEFFIELD BOARD OF COMM'RS

electoral process within a designated State or political subdivision as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision ..
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding,
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State
would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In
such a situation, the reason for including the political sub~.
divisions is not that they are defined in § 14 (c) ( 2) and therefore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility
for designation apart from the State is without significance
once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the political subdivisions are covered because they are within the jurisdiction of the designated unit and might be delegated its
authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting.
Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the
meaning of § 14 (c) (2) , I agree with the Court that it too is
subject to § 5 and must comply with its requirements.

.a.-..::..

bf ~ste.'~
d3o '1r

~DRAFT
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA1m
No. 76-1662
United States, Appellant,

) On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
Board of Commissioners of Shefthe Northern District of
Alabama.
field, Alabama, et al., Appellees.

v.

!(January -, 1978]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
Given the Court's reading of the Voting Rights Act in prior
decisions. and particularly in Allen v. State Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544 (1969), and Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379
( 1971), I concur in th e juclgment of tho Court. In addition,
I concur in Part III of the Court's opinion.
Although my reservations as to the constitutionality of tho
Act have not abated,* I believe today's decision to be correct
under this Court's precedents and necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, as construed in Allen and
Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense
to limit the preclearance requirement to ~ political units
charged with voter registration. As the majority observes,
ante, at 13, such a con struction of tho statute could enable
covered States or political subdivisions to Q.e~ate 1 es]'ls~si 
~ility f o r ch anE!il~!li t"Rs slEHltSP&l t'l 68@{:18 ts local entities that
do not conduct voter registration. A coverrd State or political subdivision thereby could achieve through its in strumentalities what it could not do itself without preclearance.
I agree with the Court that a more sensible con struction OT
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose. is to
treat the governmental units respon sible for changes in the
·X·See Allen v. Statr Board of Elections. supra, nt 50.'5 (l3lnck, .T.. diRsenting) ; Georgia v. U.S. , 411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (PowEr-r., J., di:.;scnting) .

~allow

~ Cl~~o me ft~fo~t~ibil;
.f.r ch '"Jii\J

elu.hrtAI

tl.t.

rro c.e~S

76-1662-CONCUR (A)
2

UNITED STATES v. SHEFFIELD BOARD OF COMM'RS

electoral process within a designated State or political subdivision as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision.
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding,
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State
would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In
such a situation, the reason for including the political subdivisions is not that they are defined in § 14 (c) (2) and therefore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility
for designation apart from the State is without significance
once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the political subdivisions are covered because they are within the jurisdiction of the designated unit and might be delegated its
authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting.
Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the
meaning of§ 14 (c)(2), I agree with the Court that it too is
subject to § 5 and must comply with its requirements .

.

~

6 9
Mr. Justice Powell,
There is a docket sheet to match this
case inside the binder cover of the Docket
Sheet book in case you need to record a vote
today.
Linda

·I

·~

'

1

'

June 16, 1977 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No.

76~1662

UNITED STATES, Movant

Motion to Expedite
Consideration of
Jurisdictional Statement

v.
( .....___

BD. OF COMM'~S OF
SHEFFIELD, ALA.
SUMMARY;

The SG asks the Court to expedite consideration of the

government's appeal from the decision of a three-judge USDC (ND Ala.)
(Rives, Grooms, McFadden} that cities (and other political units of
a state} which have elections but do not conduct their own voter
registration are exempt from §5 of the Voting Rights Act.
FACTS:

In essen-;;-§;.. requ~th~whenever ...a coveredY "State

of political subdivision'' seeks to change any voting procedure, it
must first :;5eek preclearance from the

u.s.

AG, who has 60 days to

object (or it may seek preclearance from the USDC D.C.).

Section

14(c) (2) of the Act defines "political subdivision" as any county,
parish, or other subdivision of a state which conducts registration
for voting,
( '-.

:/States or political subdivisions are covered by the Act (§4) if they
maintained any test or device for voting on November 1, 1964, as certified by the AG, and if the Director of the Census determines that less
than 50% of the eligible persons either registered or voted that year.

.'
- 2 In 1965, Alabama was designated a state covered by the Act.
On March 20, 1975, the city of Sheffield asked the AG for preclearance
of its proposal to hold a referendum on changing its commission form
of government to a mayor-council form.

However, on May 13, 1975,

before the AG's 60 days had expired, the referendum was held and
the change approved.

On May 23, 1975, the AG advised that he had no

objection to the referendum, but that this "does not bar subsequent
judicial action to enjoin enforcement of the change," and that it
would also be ''subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5."
Subsequently, the city requested preclearance.

In July, 1976,

the AG advised that he objected to the new procedure of electing
councilmen at-large,

rather ~ than

by ward, because he believed it

would have a racially discriminatory effect.

Nevertheless, the city

scheduled its at-large election for August 10, 1976.

(

'-.._/"

On August 9, 1976, the AG sought to enjoin the election and
implementation of the change until federal preclearance was obtained.
The DC dismissed the complqint and denied reconsideration.
DECISIONS OF DC;

The DC unanimously held that even when an

entire state is covered, §5 applies only to its political subdivisions

-

-

which satisfy the definition in the Act, and does not apply to cities,
such as Sheffield, which do not conduct voter registration.

~

Accordingly,

the city was not required to obtain preclearance.
Alternatively, two judges of the DC (Judge Rives disagreed) held
that by approving the referendum, the AG also approved the change to
at-large election ''notwithstanding his caution to the city that the
change was also subject to preclearance."

( '-'

This was so either because

the prior approval contained implicit approval of the

at~large

or because it exhausted the AG's authority under the Act,

election

Judge Rives

believed that the AG had preserved his right to later object to the
at-large method of election.

'

.
-

3 -

In its opinion denying rehearing, the unanimous DC expressly
rejected the government's argument that §5 applies to all political
units (regardless of whether they conduct registration) in a state
which has been designated as covered by the Act.
SG'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS:

The SG argues that the DC's

holding is based on a literal reading of §5, and is inconsistent with
the Act's structure, original legislative history, consistent interpretation by the AG since 1965, and congressional endorsement thereof
when the Act was extended and amended in 1970 and 1975.

The only

purpose of the definition of "political subdivision" is to trigger
determination of coverage by the AG and Census Director under §4,
and not to exclude cities within covered states or political subdivisions from the scope of §5.

The SG argues that the designation

of a state or political subdivision as covered by the Act constitutes

("--'

a designation of all voting units within it, and that the contrary
holding below is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.
)

The SG also alleges a conflict with other three-judge courts,
and notes that because of this case, three school districts in
Texas have notified the AG that they would not heed his objections
to changes in their voting procedures.
Regarding the majority's alternative holding, the SG argues that
the entire plan was not before the AG when he approved the referendum.
CONTENTION

ON THE MOTION:

The SG asks the Court either to

summarily reverse or to note probable jurisdiction this term because
the decision below has engendered substantial confusion as to the
coverage of §5.

(

DISCUSSION:

'
The DC majority's alternative
holding seems incorrect

"---·

on the facts, particularly in light of language in §5 that the AG's

7

failure to object will not "bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforce-

j

T

'

Court

Voted on . ................. , 19 . . .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 .. .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .
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vs.

BD . OF COMM'RS . OF SHEFFIELD, ALA.
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0{-

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM

(

'--

June 16, 1977 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 76-1662

Response to Motion to
Expedite Consideration
of Jurisdictional Statement

UNITED STATES, Movant

v.
BD, OF C0tf.J11 RS OF
SHEFFIELD r ALA,
RESP'S CONTENTIONS:
answer

st~ting

At the Court's request, resp has filed an

that it does not object to expedited consideration of

the appeal provided it is allowed adequate time to file a motion to
dismiss or affirm.
June 20,

~esp

is

~ttempting

to file such a motion by

However, if, due to the shortness of time, resp cannot do

so, the Court is asked to deny the motion.
( ....____.

Resp points out that i t

did not know until June 9, that a response to the JS was due on
June 20; the response had originally been due on June 24.

- 2 DISCUSSION:

Although it would be preferable to see the

response before the Court acts, if it is not filed by June 20
and if June 23 is to be the final conference, the Court probably
has sufficient information upon which to note (or postpone) probable
jurisdiction.
6/14/77
PJN

(

_./

( ' -/

Richman

Court

-
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Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
June 23, 1977 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
No. 76-1662 ATX

from USDC (ND Ala.)
Grooms, McFadden)

UNITED STATES

,-n. .~F

A..:,.o
1
{).

~

COMM 1 RS OF

SHEFFIELD, ALABAMA
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

.·

Timely

The SG asks ·the Court to note jurisdiction or summarily

~

reverse the decision of the three-judge USDC that cities (and other

fl'k \

political units of a state) which have elections but do not conduct
their own vo~~is~a~on are e~mpt from §5 of the Voting Righ~s

-

Act,

FACTS, DECISIONS AND SG'S CONTENTIONS:

These items are set out

in my memorandum on the motion to expedite (attached) • ~
APPELLEES' CONTENTIONS:

Appellees have filed a motion to affirm

in which they argue that because voter registration in Alabama is
conducted by counties, cities such as Sheffield are not included

- 2 within the plain meaning of the definition of "political subdivision"
(§14(c) (2)), which limits the scope of the Act.

Thus, affirmance

is required by the plcinmeaning rule.
If, despite the rule, resort is had to the legislative history,
appellees argue that it only confirms their statutory language argument,

They quote from the legislative history that the term "'politica=

subdivision' is not intended to encompass precincts, election districts
or other similar units when they are within a county or parish which
supervises registration for voting."

They also cite testimony before

the House subcommittee considering an earlier Dept. of Justice bill
in which AG Katzenbach stated that "the whole bill really is aimed
at getting people registered," and that political subdivision means
''that area for which people are registered and within which a registrar
board operates.

It is called different names in different states."

He also stated he was aware how voter registration was accomplished
in Alabama,

Appellees argue that Senator Talmadge's statement that

the Act would cover Georgia's cities (JS 12-13) does not undercut
th.eir position because at that time voter registration in Georgia
was conducted by cities.
~ ·

Appellees also argue ' that the subsequent re-enactments of the
Act do not constitute congressional approval of the AG's consistent
interpretation because such a rule of statutory construction is only
an aid in resolving ambiguous language,
Regarding the holding of the majority below that the AG had in
~act

approved the change to at-large elections when he failed to

object to the referendum on changing to a mayor-council form of
government,

appellees claim that the AG was aware at the time he

approved the referendum that Alabama law would mandate at-large
election because of

Sheffield~s

size.

~ppellees

also assert that they

- 3 -

did not believe the Act applied, but sought the AG's approval out of
an abundance of caution, and so stated in their letter to him.
Finally, appellees contend there is no conflict because the
defense raised in this case was not asserted in those cited by the
SG.
DISCUSSION:

The exclusion from the Voting Rights Act of cities

and other non-registering political units creates a loophole which
could be used to defeat the purpose of the Act, and therefore the
question whether the loophole was created by the court below or by
Congress is note-worthy.

However, because the plan language appears

to support the holding of the court below, summary reversal would
not seem to be appropriate.
There is a motion to affirm.·
6/21/77

DC : Ops in ' JS

Richman

PJN

.•·

June 16, 1977 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No.

76~1662

UNITED STATES, Movant

Motion to Expedite
Consideration of
Jurisdictional Statement

v.

(

BD. OF COMM 1 RS OF
SHE:FFIELD, ALA.
SUMMARY:

The SG asks the Court to expedite consideration of the

government's appeal from the decision of a three-judge USDC (ND Ala.)
(Rives, Grooms, McFadden} that cities (and other political units of
a state} which have elections but do not conduct their own voter
.•

registration are exempt from §5 of the Voting Rights Act.
FACTS:

~ political

In essence, §5 requires that whenever a covered::! "State
subdivision'' seeks to change any voting procedure, it

must first seek preclearance from the

u.s.

AG, who has 60 days to

object (or it may seek preclearance from the USDC D.C.).

Section

14(c) (2) of the Act defines "political subdivision" as any county,

-

parish, or other subdivision of a state which conducts registration

for voting,
:/States or political subdivisions are covered by the Act (§4) if they
any test or device for voting on Nove~ber 1, 1964, as certified by the AG, and if the Director of the Census determines that less
than 50% of the eligible persons either registered or voted that year.

maint~ined

..
- 2 In 1965, Alabama was designated a state covered by the Act.
On March 20, 1975, the city of Sheffield asked the AG for preclearance
of its proposal to hold a referendum on changing its commission form
of government to a mayor-council form.

However, on May 13, 1975,

before the AG's 60 days had expired, the referendum was
the change approved.

On May 23,

he~d

19~~A~
he
1\

and
had no

objection to the referendum, but that this "does not bar subsequent
judicial action to enjoin enforcement of the change," and that it
would also be "subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5."
Subsequently, the city requested preclearance.

In July, 1976,

the AG advised that he objected to the new procedure of electing
councilmen at-large, rather than by ward, because he believed it
would have a racially discriminatory effect.

Nevertheless, the city

scheduled its at-large election for August 10, 1976.

(

On August 9, 1976, the AG sought to enjoin the election and
implementation of the change until federal preclearance was obtained.
The DC dismissed the complaint and denied reconsideration.
DECISIONS OF DC:

The DC unanimously held that even when an

entire state is covered, §5 · applies only to its political subdivisions
which satisfy the definition in the Act, and does not apply to cities,
such as Sheffield, which do not condu~t voter registration.

According! ~

the city was not required to obtain preclearance.
Alternatively, two judges of the DC {Judge Rives disagreed) held
that by approving the referendum, the AG also approved the change to
at-large election "notwithstanding his caution to the city that the
change was also subject to preclearance."

This was so either because

the prior approval contained implicit approval of the

at~large

or because it exhausted the AG's authority under the Act,

election

Judge Rives

believed that . the AG had preserved his right to later object to the ·
at-large method of election.

f

'

-

3 -

In its opinion denying rehearing, the unanimous DC expressly
rejected the government's argument that §5

app~ies

to all political

units (regardless of whether they conduct registration) in a state
which has been designated as covered by the Act.
SG'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS:

The SG argues that the DC's

holding is based on a literal reading of §5, and is inconsistent with
the Act's structure, original legislative history, consistent interpretation by the AG since 1965, and congressional endorsement thereof
when the Act was extended and amended in 1970 and 1975.

The only

purpose of the definition of "political subdivision" is to trigger
determination of coverage by the AG and Census Director under §4,
and not to exclude cities within covered states or political subdivisions from the scope of §5.

(

The SG argues that the designation

of a state or political subdivision as covered by the Act constitutes
a designation of all voting units within it, and that the contrary
holding below is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.
The SG also alleges a conflict with other three-judge courts,
and notes that because of this case, three school districts in
Texas have notified the AG that they

w~uld

not heed his objections

to changes in their voting ' p~ocedures.
Regarding the majority's alternative holding, the SG argues that
the entire plan was not before the AG when he approved the referendum.
CONTENTION

ON THE MOTION:

The SG asks the Court either to

note probable jurisdiction this term because
the decision below has engendered substantial confusion as to the
coverage of §5.
DISCUSSION:
~ on

The DC majority's alternative holding seems incorrect

the facts, particularly in light of language in §5 that the AG's

failure to object will not "bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforce-

•
- 4 ment."

Moreover, since the city held the referendum b e fore the AG's

time for objection had

expired~

his subsequent approval of the

referendum should not in any event estop him from further action.
Thus, the statutory question cannot be avoided, and the case
appears to be a likely note because of the importance of the issue.
However, since the DC's holding is supported by the literal language
of §5, summary reversal would not appear appropriate. J~
Nevertheless, the issue apparently affects a large number of
voting units in the country, and should be settled as soon as possible.
Noting probable jurisdiction before recess would allow briefing this
summer and an early argument; similarly, affirming now would settle
the question.

7
(

Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to grant the

motion to expedite, and set the case for consideration at the June 23,

1977 Conference. _

Alt~ough

the response to the JS is not due until

June 24, an earlier response could be called for.
There is no response to the motion.
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SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

A Georgia election law was amended to

stagger the terms of a three person board of county commissioners,
without being submitted for approval under §5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.

At appellants' instance, a three-judge

district court enjoined future elections under the law as
amended until approval was gained, but it refused to set aside

----------------------------------------------~
to
be held in 1978, would be for unstaggered

'--~~------a recent election under it or to order that the next election,

was not gained by then.

----

terms if approval

Appellant complains of the refusal to

grant the latter forms of relief.

- 2 2.

C.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Under a 1964 Georgia

statute applicable only to Peach County, the county board of
commissioners of roads and revenues is composed of three
commissioners elected by the county at large .

One commissioner

must reside in a named city in the county, one outside the
city and within the county, and one may reside anywhere in the
county.

These seats are denominated Posts 1, 2, and 3,

respectively.
Under the 1964 statute, all three posts carried four-year
terms.

Elections for the three posts were held in 1964 and

were due to be held again in 1968.

Before the 1968 elections,

the 1964 statute was amended to provide that the 1968 election
to Post 3 would be for a two-year term and that thereafter, the
post again would carry a four-year term.

The effect of the

amendment thus was to stagger the terms of the commissioners:

------...:..::-

Post 3 would stand for election in 1970, Posts 1 and 2 in 1972,
Post 3 in 1974, and Posts 1 and 2 in 1976.
The 1976 primary election for Posts 1 and 2 was scheduled
for August 10.

On August 6, appellants filed a class action

complaint in the Middle District of Georgia against the three
county commissioners and the judge of the county probate court,
individually and in their official capacities, alleging that the
1968 amendment constituted a change in voting standards,
practices, and procedures for which no judicial or administrative
approval has been obtained, in violation of §5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 4.2 U.S.C. §1973c.

The complaint

sought convening of a three-judge court under 42 U.S.C. §1973c
and the grant of declaratory and injunctive relief.

Appellants

- 3 -

also moved for a preliminary injunction against proceeding with
the

primary and general elections.
On August 9 the originating judge denied a preliminary

injunction, refusing to hold a hearing on it because he "seriously
question[ed]" whether the 1968 amendment was a "change" required
to be approved under the Voting Rights Act.

The primary was

held, and appellants renewed their request for an injunction
against holding the general election.

Sometime after the initial

denial of the preliminary injunction, appellants filed an answer
denying that the 1968 amendment was a change under the Voting
Rights Act.

The district court took no

fu~ther

action until

after the November general election was held.
After that election, a three-judge court was convened.

On

February 2, 1977, appellees filed a brief conceding that tbe lJ68
amendment was a change

cover~d

by the

Voting . R~hts

Act and

that it could not be used in future elections unless it was cleared
through one of that Act's procedures.

On February 28, 1977, the

three-judge court ordered that appellees be
enjoined from further using and enforcing in any
respect so much of [the amendment] , which [sic]
relates to the election of the Peach County Board
of Commissioners unless and until the provisions
of section five of the Voting Ri~~ts Act of 1965,
as amended, . . . have been compjWed with. This
injunction shall continue until those requirements
have been complied with and shall not otherwise be
dissolved.
The court, relying on Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393

u.s.

544 (1969), denied appellants' request that the 1976 elections
be set aside and new ones ordered, however:
Given the rather technical changes made in the
county's election law by the 1968 amendment and,
more important, the apparent ~a~& o!_~ di§criminatory purpose or effect surrounding the use

---------------~-~--~~--~--~~------~-------------------~
-~

- 4 of the law in the 1976 elections, the court
denies this request and will give this order
only prospective relief [sic] .
On March 23, 1977 appellants moved under Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
60(b) (6) for reconsideration of the district court's refusal
to set aside the election or, in the alternative, for modification
of the order to provide that if the amendment was not cleared
through the Voting Rights Act before the 1978 elections, all
three seats would be declared open in that election.
denied the motion for reconsidera·tion or

m~dification

The court
on April 26,

1977, stating that it was without jurisdiction because the case
had been appealed to this court and that it saw no reason to
reconsider.

Apparently in response to the request for

modification of the order, the court stated, "The problem of
relief is a question for a single-judge court."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellants contend that the three-judge

court misapplied Allen and abused its discretion in refusing
to set aside the 1976 elections or to declare all three posts
open for the 1978 elections unless the change was approved
under the Voting Rights Act.

They also argue that the court erred

in referring to the "apparent lack of discriminatory purpose
or effect surrounding the use of the law in the 1976 elections"
in refusing to set aside those elections; and that if discriminatory purpose or effect should be considered in deciding
whether to set aside an election, the court should have held an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
to

~taggered

They contend ·that the change

terms might disadvantage blacks because "white

voters might be more likely to vote for a black candidate if he
or she is one of three candidate3 than if the black candidate is

5 running for the only position open."

c

Appellees move to affirm on the grounds that the threejudge court acted in compliance with Allen and did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to set aside the elections or to order
elections for all three seats in 1978; and that under Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), the court did not have the
power to take any action with respect to .the two posts, the terms
of which were not affected by the 1968 amendment.
4.

DISCUSSION:

(A) Refusal to set aside elections:

This Court twice has refused to set aside elections thatmok

---------------------'--~---------~~,-----------------~---'~
place
under changes in voting laws that had not been cleared
through the Voting Rights Act procedures.

In Allen v. State Board

of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1960), the Court held that certain
changes in Mississippi voting laws should have been submitted
for approval under Section 5, but refused to set aside elections
held pursuant to the changes:
These §5 coverage questions involve complex
issues of first impression -- issues subject
to rational disagreement. The state enactments
were not so clearly subject to §5 that the
appellees' failure to submit them for approval
constituted deliberate defiance of the Act.
Moreover, the discriminatory purpose or effect
of these statutes, if any, has not been determined
by any court. We give only prospective effect
to our decision, bearing in mind that our judgment today does not end the matter so far as
these States are concerned.
Id. at 572.

In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971), the

Court held that changes in voting practices in Canton, Mississippi .
were covered by the Act, but again refused to order the election
set aside, remanding to the district court for that decision.
~

The Court stated that Allen had refused to overturn the elections
there "primarily because the scope of §5 coverage was then an

- 6 issue of first impression and 'su?ject to rational disagreement,' "
400 U.S. at 395, and that this reason did not apply in Perkins
because the elections there were held after Allen was decided.
The Court nonetheless found that the desirability of effective
enforcement of §5 was not the only factor to be considered
in fashioning a remedy for failure to submit a change for
approval:
[O]ther factors may be relevant, such as the nature
of the changes complained of, and whether it was
reasonably clear at the time of the election that
the changes were covered by §5. In certain
circumstances, for example, it might be appropriate
to enter an order affording local officials an
opportunity to seek federal approval and ordering
a new election only if local officials fail to do so
or if the required federal approval is not forthcorning. Since the District Court is more familiar
with the nuances of the local situation than are we,
and has heard the evidence in this case, we think
the question of the appropriate remedy is for that
court to determine, in the first instance, after
hearing the views of both parties.
400 U.S., at 396-97.
Thus, · the Court in Allen and Perkins tentatively has

!

identified at least three factors to be considered in deciding

whether to order so-called retroactive relief:

(1) whether the

changes in voting procedures clearly were subject to §5 approval;
(2) the "nature of the changeS complained of;" and (3) whether
the changes have been determined to have a discriminatory purpose

or effect.

In this case, appellees' concession below that the

change was covered by §5 seems to suggest there was little
question on that point, although the district court initially
showed some uncertainty and the change apparently went
unchallenged for eight years.

As to the nature of the change,

it is one that can be adopted for sound reasons.

- 7 As to discriminatory purpose or effect, the court below
noted that the change did not seem on its face to have such
purpose or effect, although appellants would dispute this.

As

appellants note, there is tension between the lower court's
reference to this factor, and this Court's holdings that a
three-judge court convened to decide whether a change is covered
by §5 should not delve into discriminatory purpose and
~'

effect~

United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County,

45 U.S.L.W. 3564 (1977).

The Court's mention of this factor

in its discussion of remedy in Allen, however, seems to invite
such consideration.

It is unclear whether the factor should be

considered even in relation to remedy after Warren County,
and whether the lower court in this case placed any significant
weight on the factor.

If the factor should be considered in

determining whether to set asioe an election, appellants may
have a point that an evidentiary hearing should be held on the
1ssue.
Appellee's reliance on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976) for the proposition that the three-judge court could not
take any action with respect to the two posts the terms of which
were not affected by the 1968 amendment is quest io nable.

In

Beer a redistricting of the seats chosen by distr ict for the
New Orleans city council left unaffected two at-large seats
that were established before enactment of the Voting Rights Act.
In the city's §5 suit for a declaratory judgment that the
changes would not have a discriminatory effect, the district court
held that the city's failure to eliminate the at-large seats did
~~

not meet the §5 test.

On appeal the United States conceded, and

- 8 this Court held, that the redistricting plan could not be
rejected solelybecause it did not eliminate the at-large seats,

bec~e, "The at-large seats, having existed without change
since 1954, were not subject to review in this proceeding
under §5."

425 U.S., at 139.

Appellees argue that this case is like Beer, because
two seats were not affected by the change in the term of the
third.

Beer could be distinguished, though, because there any

potential for discriminatory effect resulting from the existence
of the at-large seats antedated and existed independently from
the districting changes made after the Voting Rights Act was
enacted; while here, the potential for discriminatory effect
came about only upon the change in the term of Post 3 and may
effect elections for all three posts.

That is, the change to

staggered terms might properly be viewed as a "change" in the
procedures for elections for all three posts.
(B)

Refusal to order elections for all three posts in 1978

if §5 approval of the change is not gained:

It is unclear

whether appellants requested this relief from the three-judge
court before entry of its order, and that court may have
considered itself without power to modify its order later.

Also,

that court's cryptic comment in denying the motion for
modification that the matter of remedy was for a single judge
can be read as inviting appellants to return in 1978 to request
this form of enforcement of the injunction if the change is not
approved by then.

Alternatively, the injunction may prevent

elections for any posts until the change is approved.

- 9 The short of this case may be that after the change
to staggered terms had been in effect for eight years, appellants
went to court four days before the primary and failed to
convince the court to enjoin the elections.

After the elections,

the three-judge court properly enjoined future elections under
the changed statute until it is approved under §5; but it
exercised its discretion not to set aside the elections, and its
prudence in not spelling out what would happen in 1978 if the
change was not approved by then.

Although the law is not entirely

clear on what remedy should be granted in this situation

~~~
d~----

what factors should be taken into account, I do not think a
summary affirmance would be inconsistent with the Court's
previous statements and actions.
There is a response.
7/14/77
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("Act"), 79 Stat. +
439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V)/

~;t;

In pertinent parts, it provides:
J ~
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which t.he pro- rc ~
bitions set forth in [§4 (a) of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 ~ .,._£4.#12,1,~
U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1970 ed. Supp. V)l based upon determinations made • ~ T~
under the first sentence of [§ 4 (b) of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, ~
42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (b) (1970 ed. Supp. V)] are in effect shall enact o~ ,g.£~1£$
seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from tha ~ .,.,......_..
in force or in effect on November l, 1964 ... such State or subdivision ul.
~.
A
may institute an action in the United States District Court for the Dis- r.._ v-o- c.~•l.twy
trict of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, a.J ~ ~
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not. have the purpose """I
,....., J. ~
and will not have the effect of denying or abridg;ing the right to vote o~ ,;
~
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set _~
J-~ ~.forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this title, and unless and until the court...., ~ r---"'
enters such judgment no per~on shall be denied the right to vote for .-2,~...._ -/failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, sta ndard , practice,
~ •
or procedure: Provided. That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, ~· r4-4
or procedure may be enforced without such proceed ing if the qualification, ~ _
~~
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the ~
chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or sub, 1 .._.,
4-'(....
division ~o the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not inter~ ~
posed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good ~~~ 4 • (. ....1
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UNITED STATES v. SHl!-FFIELD BOARD OF COMM'RS

requires that States. like Alabama, which are covered under
§ 4 of the Act. 79 Stat. 438, as ambended. 42 U. S. C. ~ 1973b
(1970 ed., Supp. V) ,2 obtain prior federal approval before
changing any voting practice or procedure that was in effect
on November 1, 1964. The questions for decision in this case
are (1) whether § 5 requires an Alabama city that has never
conducted voter registration ~ to obtain preclearance of a voting change and (2) if so, whether the failure of the Attorney
General of the United States to object to the holding of a
referendum election at which a change is adopted constitutes
federal approval of that change.

I
The City of She:ffield, Ala. (the "City" ot· "Sheffield") was
incorporated in 1885 by the Alabama Legislature. As incorpora.ted, the City was governed by a mayor and eight councilmen, two councilmen being elected directly from each of
the City's four wards. Sheffield retained this mayor-council
government until 1912 when it adopted a system in which
three commissioners. elected by the City at large, ran the
City. This commission form of government was in effect in
Sheffield on November 1, 1964.
such submission, the Attorne~· General has affirmatively indicated that
·such objection will not be mad<{ .]"
2 Pursuant to th<' first ~entencc of§ 4 (b), Alabamn wa;; designated ns n.
covered jurisdiction on August 6, 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897, it hnving been
determined thnt Alnbama. mnintnined a "te~t or drvire" on November 1,
1964 and that "]es,:; than 50 perc<>nt of rt110se) persons of voting age
residing [in Alabnmn] either were regi,;tered on November 1, 1964 or voted
in the 1964- Presidential Election. See 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (b). Because
Alabama has not e;;tabli~hed in a judicial proceeding that the voter qualification requirement~ had not bern used for the purpose or with tlw effect of
denying or abridging the right to vot.e on :.H'cmmt of race, it is ubject to
the prohibitions of§ 4 (a), ><ee 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (a), and hence to§ 5.
8 In AlabaiJ1a. voter registration i~ conducted nt the county level by
county boa.rds of voter registmtion, the members of which are appointed
by certain state officials. See Code of Ala.,§ 17-4-40 (1975).
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Sometime prior to March 20, 1975, Sheffield decided to put
to a rflferendum the question whether the City should return
to a mayor-council form of government.~ On that date the
president of the Board of Com~nissioners of Sheffield wrote
the Attorney General of the United States to "give notice of
the proposal of submitting to the qualified voters of the City,
whether the present commission form of government shall be
abandoned in favor of the Mayor and Aldermanic form of
government." 5 On May 13, 1975, before the Attorney General
replied. the referendum opcurred, and the voters of Sheffield
approved the change.
On May 23 the Attorney General formally responded to
Sheffield that he did "not interpose an objection to the holding
of the referendum." but that "[s]ince the voters in the city of
Sheffield elected to adopt the mayor-council form of government on May 13, 1975, the change is also subject to the
preclearance requirement of Section 5." The Attorney General's letter also stated that in the event the City should elect to
seek preclearance of the change from the Attorney General
it should submit detailed information concerr}jng the change,
4 The record reflects that. the citizens of Sheffield had been considering
this change for some time. During the late 1960s. the City wrote the
Attorney General of Alabama iind raised a number of questions concerning
the procedures and mechanics for adopting a mayor-council form of
government.. The Alabama Attorney Geneml's reply. which took the form
of an opinion letter, iidvised what procedures would have to be followed
to effect such a change and informed t.he City that if the elertorate voted
to abandon the commission form of government Sheffield would return to
the aldermanic form of government "as it existed ... at the time the
commission form of government was adopted."
5 The letter provided that the proposed change was governed by Art. 3
of Title 37 of the Code of Alabama-now Code of Ala .. § 11-44-150 et seq.
(1975)-that "rpJresent existing voting wards are not. changed at the time
of voting (but mny be equitabl~· adjusted at a later date)" and thnt. "if the
present commission type is abandoned. the [mayor aldermanic form tha.t
·existed in 1912] would automatically be reinstated."

76-1662-0PINION
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including a description of '(the aldermanic form of govern~
ment which existed in 1912 and the method by which it was
elected, i. e., the number of aldermen, the terms and qualifi~
cations for the mayor and aldermen. whether the aldermen
were elected at large or by wards, whether there were num~
bered post, residency, majority vote or staggered term requirements for the aldermanic seats, and whether single shot voting
was prohibited."
Thereafter the City informed the Attorney General that the
proposed change would divide the City into four wards of
substantially equal populatio11, that each ward would have
two council seats. that councilmen from each ward would be
elected at large, and· that candidates would- run for numbered
places. Subsequently the City furnished a detailed map
showing ward boundaries, data concerning the population distribution by race for each ward, and a history of black candidacy for city and county offices since 1965. The City's submission was completed on May 5, 1976.
On July 6, 1976. the Attorney General notified the City
that while he did not "interpose any objection to the change
to a mayor council form of government, to the proposed district lines or to the at-large election of the mayor and the
president of the council," he did object to the implementation
of the proposed at-large method of electing city councilmen·
because he was "unable to conclude that the at-large election
of councilmen required to reside in districts will not have a
racially discriminatory effect."
Notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection, the City
scheduled an at-large council <'lection for August 10, 1976.
On August 9. the United States instituted this suit in the
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to enforce
its ~ 5 objection. A temporary restra.ining order w~ denied.
After the election was held, a three-judge court was convened
tt11d t_hat. court dismisse(J· t,he llllit. 430 F, Supp. 786 (NDI

•
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AI. 1977). The District Court una11imously held n that Shef:.
'field was not covered by § 5 because it is not a "political subdivision" as that term is defined in § 14 (c) (2) of the Act,
·79 Stat. 445. 42 U. S. C. § l973Z (c)(2), which provides that
"'political subdivision' means any county or parish except that
where registration for voting is not conducted under the
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any
ather subdivision of a state which conducts registration for
·voting." See 430 F. Supp., at 788-789 and 790-792. The
court also held. one judge dissenting, that "by approving the
referendum, the Attorney General in fact approved the change
to the Mayor-Council form of governme1;1t [in which aldermen
were elec'ted at large]. notwithstanding [his statement] to the
City that the change was also subject to preclearaJlCe." The
court reasoned that the approval of the referendum constituted
clearance of those aspects of the proposed change that the
Atforney General knew would be implemented if the refer-:
endum passed and that he must have known that Sheffield
wpuld be opliged to follow Code of Ala .. 11- 43- 40 (1975),
which requires the at-large election of aldermen in cities with
populations of less than ~0,000. 430 F. Supp., at 789-790.
We noted probable jurisdiction. U. S . - (1977). We
reverse.
II
I

We first consider whether Congress intended to exclude
from § 5 coverage political umts. hke ]heffield. whiCh have·
never conducted voter re istratfon. In concluding that Congress 1 , the District Court npted that § 5 applies to "a
6 The court initially decided the case on the ground that the Attorney
General's .July 6, 1976 objection was one day out of time and hence
ineffective. However, on petition for rehearing the court found that,
because .Tuly 5, 1976 was a federal holiday, the .July 6 objection was timely,
See 430 F. Sqpp., at 787. The court then considered the other grounalt,.(fiscussed infra.
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[designated] state or a [designatedl political subdivision" and
construed § 5 to provide that, where a State in its entirety has
been designated for coverage, the only political units within it
that are subject to § 5 are those that are "political subdivisions" within the meaning of§ 14(c)(2). Because the District Court interpreted § 14 (c) (2) as including only counties
and the specific functional units of state government that
register voters. it held ~hat poltical unlts like the City are not
subject to the duties imposed by§ 5.
There is abundant evidence that the District Court's inter~tion of the Act is cot}.tq}ry to the congressional intent.
Q:U:at? and most significantly. the Distnct Court's construction is inconsistent with the Act's structure, makes § 5 coverf,lge depend upon a· factor completely irrelevant to the Act's
purposes, and thereby permits precisely the kind of circumvcn~ congressiqnal policy that § 5 was designed to prevent.
ec<>IL.,the language of the Act neithe~es nor even
supports such a cramped interpretation. ~ the District
Court's reading is flatly inconsistent with the Attorney General's consistent interpretations of § 5 and with the legisla.tive
history of its enactment and re-enactments. The language,
st.-ucture. history, and purposes of the Act persuade us that
§ 5, 'like the constitutional provisions it is designed to implement, applies to all entities having power over any aspect of
the electoral process within designated jurisdictions. not only
to counties or to whatever units of state government perform
the function of registering voters.
A

Although this Court has described the workings of the
Voting Rights Act in prior cases. sec, e. g., Allen v. State
Board of Elections, 393 U. S..)44 ( 1969); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). it is appropriate again to
summarize its purposes and structure and the special function
of § 5. Congress adopted the Act in 1965 to implement the
fifteenth Amendment and erase the blight of racial cliscrimi·

J
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11ation in voting. See id., at 308. The core of the Act "is a
C,2DJQMGX scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where
voting disc'i!imfn a.tion has been the most flagrant." !d., at
315. Congress 'resorted to these stern measures because
experience had shown them to be necessary to eradicate the
"insidious and pervasive evil of [racial discrimination in
voting] that had been perpetrated in certain parts of the
country." /d., at 309. Earlier efforts to end this discrimination by facilitating case-by-case litigation had proved ineffective in large part because voting suits' had been "unusually
onerous to prepare" and "exceedingly slow" to produce results.
And even when favorable decisions had been obtained, the
affected jurisdictions often "merely switched to discriminatory
devices not covered by the federal decrees." See id., at
313-314.

1

In pertinent parts,§ 4 (a) provides:
"(a) To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be
denied the right to vote in an~r Federal, State, or local election because o(
his failure to comply with any test or device in ;my State with respect to
which the drterminations have been made under the first two sentences o(
subsection (b) of this section or in any political subdivision with respect to
which such determination" havr been madr a~ a ~rparntr unit un)c&; the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for
a declaratory judgment brought by Rurh State or subdivision against the
United States has determined that no such trst or device has been used
du~ing the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose
or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account o(
race or color r.J" 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (a) (1970'
eel. Supp. V).
8 In pertinent parts, § 4 (b) provides:
"(b) The provisions of [§ 4 (a)] shall apply in any State or in any political
subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General deter!J1ines maintained on Novembrr I, 1964, nny test or device, and with respect to which
(2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per rentum
of tht':' per:;ons of voting agr residing therein were registered on Novem-·
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subject to the Act's special measures. Congress having found
that there was a high probability of pervasive racial discrimination in voting in areas that employed literacy tests or similar
voting qualifications and that. in addition, had low voter
turnouts or registration figures. it provided that coverage in a
State is "triggered" if it maintained any "test or device" 0 on a
specified date and if it had voter registration or voter turnout
of less than 50% of those of voting age during specified presidential elections. When this formula is not met in an entire
State, coverage is triggered in any "political subdivision"
within the State that satisfies the formula.. Since § 4 (c) of
the Act defines "test or device" as a "prerequisite for voting or
registration for voting," 79 Stat. 438. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (c).
(emphasis supplied). it is clear that the Attorney General, in
making a coverage determination, considers not only the voter
registration process within a jurisdiction, but also the procedures followed by the election officials at the polling places.
A state or political subdivision which does not use literacy
tests to determine who may register to vote but employs such
tests a.t the polling places to determine who may cast a ballot
may plainly be covered under § 4 (b).
If designated under § 4 (b). a jurisdiction will become
subject to the Act's special remedies unless it establishes. in
a judicial action, that no "test or device" was used to discriminate on the basis of race in voting. Section 4 (a) is
one of the Act's core remedial provisions. Because Congress
her 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the·
pfe!:<idential election of November, 1964." 79 Stat . 438, as amended, 42'
U.S. C.§ 1973 (b) (1070 ed . S11pp. V).
n Section 4 (c) of the Act defines "te:<t or device" to "mean an~' requirement. that n person nH a prerequisite for voting or rcgistrntion for voting
(1) demonstmte the ability to reacl. write, undeT~tand, or interpret any
matter, (2) demonstrate rmy educational achievemrnt or his knowledge of
· any particular subject, (3) pos~ess good moral character, or (4) prove hi~
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any otheJ'·
·-elass." 79 Stat. 438,42 U. S. C.§ 1973b (c) .
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determined that the continued employment of literacy tests
and similar devices in covered areas would perpetuate racial
discrimination. it suspended their use in ~ 4 (a). Just as the
conduct of all election officials is relevant under ~ 4 (b). so
§ 4 (a) imposes a duty 011 every entity in the covered jurisdictions having power over the electoral process. whether or not
the entity registers voters. That ~ 4 (a) has this geographic
.reach is clear both from the fact that a "test and device" may
be employed by any official with control over any aspect of
an election and from ~ 4 (a)'s provision that its suspension
operates "in any [designated] State ... or in any [designatedl political subdivision." (Emphasis supplied.) The
congressional objectives plainly required that ~ 4 (a) apply
throughout each designated subdivision.' 0 If it did not have
this scope. the covered States. which in the past had been so
ingenious in the~the spirit of?ea"erar law. COUid
have easilY circuriwent ea § 4 ral by,
a lscontinuing the
use of literacy tests to determine who may register but requiring that all citizens pass literacy tests at the polling places
before voting.
Although ~ 4 (a.) is a potent weapon. Congress recognized
that it alone would not ensure an end to racial discrimination
in voting in covered areas. In the past. States and the politi-

;:-g:

. "1° The 1975

nmrndments to thP Art eliminate nny question but thnt.
an~· state nctor within a d~ignated
jurisdiction. Since these :unendments provide that, a>: to juri:-;dictions that
are considrred for covrrnge brcauRe the~· had low voter turnout or registration in the November 1972 election, the phra;;e " trst or device" includes
"any registm tion or voting notice;;;, forms, instruct ions. assistance, or other
ma.t erials or information relating to t.lw elrctoral process, including ballots,
only in the English language, wherr thr Director of the Census determines
that moiT than five prr centum of the citizens of \'oting ngP residing in sue~
State or political subdiviRion arr mrmber;; of a ;;inglc lnnguage minority,"
89 Stnt. 401. 42 U.S. C.§ 19n (f)(3). it i;; indi,;putablr that Congre~
contemplatPd that thr suspen~ion of tp;;t>' and drvices would apply to local
officials other than t ho,;p who were employrd by the function a] unit of stntO
'gQvernment that conducted voter rPgistrntion.

§ 4 (n)'s prohibition hn,: to npply to
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cal units within them had responded to federal decrees outlawing discriminatory practices by "resorting to the extraordinary strategem of contriving new rules of various kinds for
the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination."
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 lT. S .. at 335 (footnote omitted). To prev('nt any future circumvention of constitutional policy, Congress adopted § 5 and shifted the
advantages of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the
evil to its victims by freezing a cove reef" .1 ur1sdietion's Cl~
tion proced ures unless the changes could be shown to be
nondiscriminatory.
The foregoing discussion of the structure of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 belies the District Court's conclusion that
§ 5 should apply only to counties and to the political units
that conduct voter registration. As is apparent from the Act.
§ 5 "was structured to assure the effectiveness of the dramatic
step Congress [took] ill § 4" and "is clearly designed to march
in lock-step with § 4." Allen v. State Boatd of Elections,
supra, 393 U.S .. at 584 (Harlan, J .. concurring and dissenting).
Since jurisdictions may be designated under § 4 (b) by reason
of the actions of election officials who do not register voters
and since§ 4 (a) imposes duties on all election officials. whether
or not they are involved in voter registration. it follows from
the very structur<' of the Act that § 5 has to apply to all
entities exercising control over the electoral processes within
the covered States of political subdivisions. In view of the
structure of the Act. it would be unthinkable to adopt the
District Court's construction unless there were persuasive
evidence either that § 5 was intended to apply only to changes
affecting the registration process or that Congress clearly
manifested an intention to restrict § 5 coverage to counties or
to the units of local govt>rnment that register voters. But the
Act supports neither conclusion.
The terms of the Act and decisions of this Court clearly
indicate that § 5 was not intended to apply only to voting
~hauges occurring within the registration process. Section 5
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applies "to any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard. practice, or procedure with respect to voting[.]"
Since the statutory definition of "voting" includes "a.ll actions
necessary to make a vote effective in any . . . election. including, but not limited to, registration, . . . casting a ballot, and
having such ballot ])roperly counted [.]." 79 Stat. 445. 42
U. S. C. § 1973l (c) ( 1), § 5's coverage of laws affecting voting
is comprehensive.
The Cour 's decisions over the past 10 years have given
§ 5 the broad scope suggested y t e anguage o t e ct.
We 'first' construed it in Allen v. State Board of Elections,
supra. There our examination of the Act's objectives and
original legislative history led us to interpret § 5 to give it
"the broadest possible scope." id., fit 567. and to require prior
federal scrud ny or "any state enactment which altered the
1
election law in a covered state in ~ven a minor way." \\ !d., a.t
566. In so coqstrucing § 5. we una mmously re:iected 11 -as the
plain terms of the Act would themselves have seemingly
required-the firgument of an appellee that § 5 should apply
only to enactments affecting who may register to vote. Id.,
at 564.
Our decisions have required federal preclearance of laws
changing the location of polling place. see Perkins v.
Mathews, 400 U ."'S. g7~ (Th1n-:-1aws adopting at-large systems
of election, Perk·ins v. Mathews, supra; Fairley v. Pq.tterson
(decided with Allen, supra); laws providing for ~he appointment of previously elected officials. Bunton v. Patterson
(deciqed with Allen, supra); laws regulating candidacy.
Whitley v. Williams (decided with Allen, supra.); laws changing
voting procedures. Allen, supra; annexa.tions. City of Rich11 Although both \Ir . .Ju~ticl' Harlan nnd \Jr ..Justice Black dissented
from aspect>' of the Court's holding- in A'l/en. neither disagreed with the
prowsition that. the ~tntute had to be ron:;trued as covering changes
occurring outside the rcgi~tration procrsR. &>c Allen v. State Board of
'Elections, supra. :393 U. S., at 591-59:~ (Harlan, J., concurring and dissept'ing); id., a.t 595 (Bl!lck, .T., dissenting).
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mond v. United States, 422 F. R. 358 ( 1975); C1:ty of Petersburgh v. U·n ited States, 410 U. R. 962 ( 1973). aff'g per curiam,
354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972); Perkins v. Mathe·ws, supra;
and reapportionment and redistricting. Beer v. United States,
425 U~.---f3o (I 9-,5) ; Geor gw v. 7Jii.ited Stales, 411 U. S. 526
(1973); see United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U. R.
144 (1977). In these instances. federal scrutiny of the proposed changes was required because each had the potential to
deny or dilute the rights conferred by ~ 4 (a).
In several of these cases, this Court decided that ~ 5's pre-clearance requirement applied to cities within designated States
without ever inquiring whether the cities conducted voter registration. See Beer v. United Sta.tcs, supra; City of Richmond
v. United States, supra; Perkins v. Mathews, supra. It is
doubtful. moreover. that ~ 5 \vould have been held to be
applicable in at least one of these cases if the District Court's
interpretation of ~ 5 were the law.'~ 1\.lthough the assumption
of these decisions-that cities are covered whether or not they
conduct voter registration-perhaps has little stare decisis
significance-the issue not having been raised "'-these decisions underscore the obvious fact that. whether or not they
register voters. cities can enact measures with the potential to
dilute or defeat the voting rights of minority group members.
Because ~ 5 embodies a judgment that voting changes
occurring outside the registration process have the potential
to discriminate in voting on the basis of race. it would be
12 Cit11 of Richmond v. United States. W7H·a. of cour~r, involved a city in
Virginia. There voter rrgi8trntion, whiiP conducted on n citywide bnsis,
is-nnd was at. the timr of that ense-prrformrd. not b~· rmployees of the
city, but by an electornl board appointrd by stntr judgef:. Srr Vn. Code
Tit. 24.1, §§ 29, 43-46 (Cum. A. Supp. 1977). Under thr District Court's
reading of § 5. it would sepm that T{irhmond':< Elrctoral Board, but not.
the city itself, would be covPred.
13 There is support for the propo~ition thnt previous derisions of this·
Court in which issueo; were not qttrstionrd but were pn~sed sub silenti6·
should not lightly be disregarded.. See Qrown Shoe Co. v. United States;.

~

u. S,a94, 307
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i·rrational for ~ 5 coverage to tum on whether· the political
unit euacting or administering the change itself registers
voters. But quite apart from the fact that this cramped construction can not be squared with any reaonable set of objectives, the District Court's interpretation of ~ 5 would permit
the precise evil that ~ 5 was designed to eliminate. Under it.
local political entities like Sheffield wot~ld be fr-ee to respond to
local pressure to limit the political power of minorities and
take steps that would, temporarily at least, dilute or entirely
defeat the voting rights of minorities. e. g., providing for the
appointment of officials who previously had been elected. moving the polling places to areas of the city where minority
gro4p members could not safely travel. or even providing that
election officials could not count the ballots of minority voters.
The only recours£' for the minority group members affected
by such changes would be the one Congress implicitly found
to be unsatisfactory: repeated litigation. Ree Uuited Jewish
Organization v. Carey, supra, 430 U. S .. at 156. Not only
would the District Court's reading place the advantages of
time and inertia back on the perpetrators of the discrimination as to a.ll elections conducted by political units that do not
re~ister voters. it would invite States to circumvent the Act in
all other elections by allowing local entities that do not conduct
voter registration to control critical aspects of the electoral
process. The clear consequence of this interpretation would
be to nullify both ~ 5 and the Act in a large number of its
potential applications.

B
The terms of the Act do not require such an absurd result.
In arriving a.t its interpret atlO'n-of 1 t.'trtf''"Distrw't""eourt
focused on its language "a State or political subdivision with
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in [ § 4 (a)] based
upon determin!ltions made under [~ 4 (b)l are in effect."
While § 5's failure to use the ph'rase "in a [ desigt1ated] State or
subdivision" arguably provides a basis for an inference that
'§ 5 was not intended to have the territorial reach of § 4 (a),

I
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the actual terms of ~ 5, considered together with the Act's
structure. suggest that Congress contemplated that ~ 5's coverage would be coterminous with ~ 4 (a)'s. The coverage
provision of ~ 5 specifically refers to both ~ 4 (a.) and § 4 (b).
a fact which itself implies that § 4-not § 14 (c) (2)-is to
determine the reach of § 5. And the content of § 5 supports
this view. Section 5 provides that it is to apply to the jurisdictions "with respect to which" § 4 (a)'s prohibitions are in
effect. Since the States or political subdivisions "with respect
to which" § 4 (a)'s duties apply are entire territories and not
just county governments or the units of local government that
register voters, § 5 must, it would seem , apply territorially as
well.
But we need not rely only upon the structural relationship
between §§ 4 and 5 to demonstrate that the statutory terms
do not compel the District Court's cr11mped interpretation of
§ 5. The language and history of the rest of the Act rebuts
any contenh on that 6mgress" ~nded that§ 14 (c)(2) would
limit tpe coverage of § 5 to specific functional units of local
government. First. we note that the language of the Act
tends to undermine any argument that Congress believed that
§ 14 (c) (2)'s definition of "political subdivision" would have
~ny significant connotations for the coverage of § 5. Because
§ 5 reads in the disjunctive-applying to a designated "State
or political subdivision ''-the concept of political subdivision
has no statutory significance under § 5 where. as here , an
entire State has been designated. In such cases the only
question under the statute is whether a political unit, like
the City, is included within the me~ning of the term "State."
While we accept the District Court's assumption that the
designation of the State of Alabama should have the same
consequences for Sheffield as would the designation of the
county in which it is located. the fact th{tt the concept of
"political subdivision" has not direct relevance for § 5 coverage within a designated State suggests that Congress did not
~nvision that the § 14 (c) (2) definition would be determina.-
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tive of the reach of § 5. If Congress had intended that § 14
(c) (2) would impose a sweeping limitation on the scope of § 5,
surely it would not have left this "gap" in the statute.
Second. the § 14 '( c )(2) definition itself does not support
the District Court. Even agreeing, arguendo, with the District Court that § 5 imposes a preclear11nce requirement qp
only the "political subdivisions" of designated Stj:lteS, 11 the
District Court's interpretation is sustainable only if we construe § 14 (c) (2) as providing that "political subdivision"
refers to specific functional units of state government and not
to geographic territories. The Act's terms, content, and history compel a contrary conclusion on this score.
In legislation like this-which, of course, is designed to
enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth, and in some respects
the Fourteenth. Amendment, sec '((atzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U. S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. If.atzenbach, supra-011e
would expect that references to "State or political subdivision"
would not be limited to specific functional entities, but rather
would apply to all entities or persons exercising gov~rnmental
power in designated areas. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S.
395 (1969); Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 ( 1953) (amendments applv to all entities exercising governn)ental power
within the States' borders). While we may agree that the
11 Tlwrr i;.: 110 qur~tion buf fhnt fhr drsignntion of a Stnfr includr~ all
the "polificnl ~ubdivi,;ion,.;" within it, a,.; i" indieatrd b~· the following cxeerpt
from the lcgislntivr hisfor~· rrlird upon by thr Distriet Court:
"Whrre an entiw Statr falls within . , . sub:seetion r4 (b)] ~o does rach
and every political ;,;ubdivi~ion within that Statr." H. TI. Hep. No. 439,
89th Cong .. l:,;t Sr:<,.;., p. 25 (19H5): 1-'ee S. Rrp. No. Hi2, Part:~, R9th Cong.,
1st. Srs~ .. p. 23 ( 1965).
Of course, thr Disfricf Court',.; assumption fo thr contrnry notwithstanding, this statement does not r~tablish I hat the on!~· enfitir:< in drsignatrd
States which :u·r subject to §5 nrP tho~<r thnt arp rithrr counties or the
units thnt regi:;ter voters. Tndrrd, :<incr this statrm(mf prrtnin:,; to thr
scope of § 4. which elearl~· applir~ fo all political unit::: within rovrred_
juri:<dictions, it j~ difficult to ~('(' how it rau br J'('lird upon in ~-;upport or
.ft. crnmped intrrprctation of § 5.
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languagr of tlH' Act docs not eumpel such a11 interpretation. its
terms. whrn considered in light of their sprcifie legislative
histories. the Act's structure. and the broad congn•ssional
objectives. support the intrrpretation that the phrase "political
subdivision" refers not to a. specific functional unit of state
govrrnmrnt. but rather to all state actors within covered
jurisdictions.
When considered in isolation. ~ 14 (c) ( 2) 's language provi drs no clear answer to tho question whether it is to refer to
functional units or to gt>ographic territories.'" The statutory
terms "county or parish ''-\\'hich entities seemingly fall within
the statutory drfinition \\'lwtlwr or not they conduct voter
registration '"-can refer either to functioning units of state
govrrnmrnt or to geographic areas. Similarly. "any other
subdivision of the State which conducts voter registration "entities which arc included in the definition only when counties
do not supervise voter registration-can also denote areas of
States. But while ~ 14 (c) ( 2) 's terms arc ambiguous when
considered apart from the rt>st of tho Act. the statutory contexts in which the term "political subdivision" appears leave
concluding that § l-l (e) (2) rdc•nNI onl~· to ,;pecific functional units
governmrnt, the District Court relied upon the following excerpt
from the legislatiye hi,;tor.v :
" I Th<' § 1-l (e) (2) definitionl mak<'~ el<•ar th:tf the• tPrm 'politi ca l ~ub
divi,;ion' i:-; not int ended to prwomp:1:-;~ precinct;;, Pl<'ction di"t ricts, or ot h<'r
similar unit:-; whl'n th<'~· an• within a eount~· or p:1ri~h which ~upervises
regi~tr:ltion for voting" S. Rep. No. 162, Part :~. 89th Con g., 1:-;1 Se:-;~ .. p. :n
(191l5); ~ee H. H. Rep. No. -l:{9, .S9th Cong., J:-;t Seso;., p. :~~ (HlH5).
While the statem<'nt. iR not. inrl<'vnnt, it certainly doe:-; not, clearly state
that § 14 (c) (2) rcfe r~ to function:tl entiti<'>', not. geographi<• areas, and it
assmedl.v docs not rebut the other evidence of congre~:;:;ional intent that is
referred to infrct .
JG Since til(' ><taiut<'
prond<·~ "'politica l >'uhdivi ~io n ' ,;h:lll memz :my
county or pari~h, except th:lt whcr<' regio<tration for voting i~ not conducted
under the Rupen·ision of a !'Olmt.v or pari~h. the tcrm shall indude any
othe1· s ubdivi~ion nf :l. Stale ll'hi<·h conduc·t~ regi~tration for voting"
(emphasis ~-;upplied), it seem~ beyond question that countie.~ are always
included.
1 '-ln
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little doubt that Congress understood that it delineated geographic locales. Wc have already noted that § 4 of the Act
contains the language "in I a] political subdivision''-a usage
that would be nonsensical if the term denoted only specific
functional units of local government-and that there. as elsewhere in the Act. it is certain that Congress intended to
include all entities exercising governmental power within those
territories. See also 42 LT. R. C.§~ 1973a (a) (reference to suit
to enforce guarantees of Fifteenth Amendment "in any State
o•· political subdiYision); 1973a (b) (suspension of "tests and
devices" "in any State or political subdivision" following institution of suit by Attomey General); 1973a (c).
And both the contc11t and history of § 14 (c) (2) support
this territorial reading of "political subdivision." \\re have
noted that a "county or parish" is a political subdivision
whether or not it conducts voter registration. Since county
governments that do not register voters have no greater potential to affect voting rights than do. for example. cities. the
automatic inclusion of counties would be difficult to squa•·e
with any rational policy if ~ 14 (c)(2) were intended only to
identify the govemmcntal entities that are. or may be. subjected to the Act's special duties. Not only docs the anomaly
disappear on tlw assumption § 14 ( c)(2) operates only to
delineate the areas in which the Act's special duties may
apply. but the legislaiive history explains the inclusion of
counties. 17
Thr DtrPdor of tlw C<·n~u~. who i~ om• of the fpderal oDi<'er:; charged
with rna kin~ row• rage dPtrrmina t ion~; undrr § .t (b). tr,.tified beforr Congres~.
that t.he Burrau ordinarii~· did not gathrr rrgist rat ion stat i~t ie:-; below the.
county level. Thr rr>"pon:,;p~ and comments of thr Committrr member!'!
suggest that count jp~ wrn• inrlud<'d in the drfinition of pol it ira ! subdivision
to prrmit thr Crn~u" Burrau to d,,:;ignate nrr:t~ in nonrovrrrd State::<
without. havin~ fir>'! to go 1hrou~h tlw burdrm;onw and rxpcnsi\e procedureof collecting datn ronrernin~ ~prrifi<', ~maliN loenlr~ . Srr Hrnrings of
H. n. 6400 brforr SubrommittPL' Xo. 5 of thr Hou ~e Committee on th<"
.Juclici.nry, 89th Con~ .. J ~ t Rr,:.•., :{81 -:t~.J. ( 19f\5) .
17
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More signifieantly. the very aspects of the legislative history
upon which appellees now rely suggest that ~ 14 (c) ( 2) was
in fact originally in tt•JHl<'cl to refer to geographic area:s. During the House Committee Hearings on the administration ':s
bill, then Attom(•y General Katzenbach. who played a central
role in drafting the bill and in explaining its provisions to
Congress. repeatedly. in response to questions from various
committee members. described the term "political subdivision"
·as referring to the areas in which voter registration is con' ducted. The colloquy further suggests that the Attorney
' General's understanding was intended to be reflected in the
congressional definition.· ~ Thus. the cone] usio11 is nigh inesIS "The Chairman.
Thr bill :1l~o rrfrr~ lo ' polilirnl ::;ubdivisions.' How
far down the political Rcnlr doe~ thnt go?
"Mr. Knh1enbach. T believe th:t1 tllC' t('nn ' politiral subdivision' used in
this billrenll~ · i~ aimed at ~!;Citing people regi~terecl.
"Mr. Clwirman. For examplr, in New York. . . . I tnke thnt nn
election clist rirt. would be deemed a. politiral subdi,·i~ion?
"Mr. KalzPnbaPh . r think t.hat. i~ po~~iblr, 1\Ir. Chairman, but fmnkly,
you are more familiar with how reJ!:istration is nrcomplif<hed in :\lew York
thm1 Tam. I know how if. if< :1rromplit<hrd or uot. arrompli~hed in Alnbnma.
"Mr. Chairman . What would be the lowl'~t possible political unit in
the scale?
"Mr. Kalzenbarh . What i.~ the m·ea in 1chich reaistmtion is done in
New York ? T nm not familiar with lhnl Mr. Chairman."
Hearing,; on H. 'R. 13.+00 befoTl' SubeommitteP No.5 of the Housr Committee
on the .I udiriar~·, 89th Cong .. 1~1 sc~~ .• Jl. 21 ( 1905). (Emphasis Sllpplird.)
"Mr. ::VfcCullough. If in the St:il •c of New York in 1964 there was a
political subdi,·ision where lc~::; thnn 50 percent of the people voted or were
registered to vote, wouldn't. that trigger thi~ bill in that political ~ubdivision
in the State of New York?
"l\lfr. K:1tzenbarh . I think it could Congrcs~mm1. 1 I hink the only way
in which we rnn gnther vnlid "tati:-;lic~ hrre i~ rrnlly-wc arc niming at
voter registration and T think the term ' political subdivisio-n' is used here
aimed primarily at I he area in which the 1'e gi&tmtion ]Jrcoess takes 7Jlace."·
ld., nt p. 51. (Emph:1~1~ supplied.)
"Mr. Roger,:. Scrtion + (n) provided that. when ilw Attorne~· General'
·certifies that he has received the complaints in writing from 20 or more·
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capable that ~ 14 (c) (2) was intended only to limit the areas
that could be subjected to the Act's special remedies. not to
limit the entities that would be subject to the Act's duties
within the covered jurisdictions.
Although the evidence that § 14 (c) (2) invariably has a
geographic referent is compelling. we need not take the position that "political subdivision" always denotes geographic
areas to decide this case. For present purposes. it is enough
that it is certain that the phrase has this mea.ning in some
provisions of the Act. For. in view of the structure of the Act
"itnd the congressional objectives, it is clear that if "politica.l
subdivision" ever refers to all the politica.J units within designated areas. it must have this meaning to the extent that the
concept of "political subdivision" determines the reach of § 5.
So wlwther one focuses on the terms of § 5 alone or upon the
meaning of § 14 (c)(2), the language of the Act refutes the
District Court's conclusion that § 5 does not apply to the
political units like the City.
residents of a politieal ~11bdivision ... what do you interpret as a
political :<ubclivi~ion in thnt, ca:<c?
"Mr. Katzenbach. I brlieve thai political subdivision there means the
same thing :ll'l it men.ns in Section 3, Congressman." Td., nt . 53.
"Mr. Cramrr. In rvrry cit~· or j)olit ical subdivision in rver~· county?
"Mr. K:1tzrnbach . Politil'al subdivision. a;; I attrmptecl to say, in my
judgment, means that area. for ll'hi('h prople are registered and within which
a registrar board operates. It i~ callPd diffrrrnt names in different. states.
That is the rra~on for u~ing the tPrm 'political ~ubdivi~ion ' but it is meant
to be coincidental ll'ith the area unde1· the SU7Jf'1'Vision of a board o/
1'egistration or election ." fd .. :tl iR. (Empha~i~ ~upplird.)
u:Mr. Tenzer. Th:~nk .von. Mr. Chairman. I just hnve Ollf' question.
Since you agree to define in thr Ia\\' i he trrm 'elect ion,' would ~·ou also to
agree to definf' i he trnn ' political subdivi~ion,' so i here would be no
question about that as one that regularly maintain~ n ~yHiem for registering·
voters ?
"Mr. Katzenba ch. I think it might br :1 good idra io definr political"
subdivision . I i hink the committee ought. to con:;ider giving it considera~·
fion ." Tel., at 121.
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Finally, the lcgislativf' history and other rf'latcd aids to asrpr·~
taining congrPssional intf'nt leavc littlr doubt but that Congress
has alway ·-and certainly by 1075-understood that the Act
applies territorially and includes political units like Sheffield
whether or not they conduct voter registration. The specific
narrow question was not extensively discussed at the tinw of
briginal enactment. but there is nothing in the original legislative history that in any wa.y supports the narrow construction
of the District Court. At least one statement made in the
course of the debate over ~ 5 strongly suggests that Congress
never intended to draw a distinction between cities that do
and do not register voters. Tn support of an amendment that
would have strick<'n ~ 5 from the Act. Senator Talmadge of
Georgia--min u tt>s before tlw Rena tc voted to reject his amendment--argued that the section was "far· fetched" h<'cauS<• it
would require any city which sought to enact or administPr a
voting change> to obtain federal preclcaranc(•. 111 Cong. Rec.
10729. While this statement was made by an opponent of
the Act. its proponents. one of whom was on the floor defending~ 5 at the time of Senator Talmadge's statement co11cerning
its effect. se<' 111 Cong. Rcc. 10728 (remarks of Ren. Tydings).
did not disagree with his assesment. which lends the stat<'ment
significant pertinence. See Arizona v. California , 37:3 C S.
546. 548 n. 85 (1963).
What is perhaps a more compelling ar·gument concerni11g
the original. and subsequent. congressional understanding of
the scope of ~ 5 is that the Attonrey Ge11era.l has, since the Act
was adopted in H)65. interpreted ~ 5 as requiring al'l political
units in designated jurisdictions to preclear proposed voti11g
changes.' n This con tern poraneous a elm i 11 istra ti V(' construction
of the Act is persua~ive evidence of the original understanding,
19 Thc r<•rord rrfl c et~ that lwill'<'rn .\up;u,.:t (i, 1965 and \Iay l. 1977. the
At tornr~· Grnrral rrrri1·rd morr than SJOO propo~rd 1·ot ing; ehangr:< front
lJOiitirHI unib other thnn rountir,- or puri"hr" thni <lo not rrgi"t<•r voter~.
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especially in light of the extensive role the Attorney General
played in drafting the statute and expla.ining its operation to
Congress.~~~ See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205.210 (1972); Udall v. Tallrna.n, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
In recognition of the Attorney General's key role in the
formulation of the Act, this Court in the past has given great
deference to his interpretations of it. See Perkins v. Mathews,
.supra, 400 U. R.. at 390-391, 393-394." 1 Moreover. the Attorney General's longstanding construction of the ~ 5 was reported
to Congress by Justice Department officials in connection with
the 1975 extension of the Act. See testimony of Assistant
Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger at the Hearings on
JI. R. 939. H. R. 2148. H. R. 3247. fl.nd H. R. 3501 before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary. 94th Cong .. 1st Sess.. p. 166
(1975) ("1975 House Hearings"); testimony of Assistant
Attorney General .J. Stanley Pottinger at the Hearings on
S. 407, S. 903. R. 1297, R. 1409. and S. 1443 before Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, pp. 598-599 (1975) ("1975 Renate Hearings").""
And the legislative history of the 1970 and 1975 re-enactments compellingly supports the conclusion that Congress
20 Ser tc~timon~· of Attornr~· General KatzE:>nbaeh. In Hraring on H. R.
,!)400 beforr Subcommitter No.5 of thr Hon~r Committrf' on the .JudiciarY.,
.89th Cong., l~t. Se:;::; .. p. f) et .~e<J. (196.5), nnd tr~timon~· of AttornP~· Genera.!
Katzenbach on S. 15()-J- brforr thr Srnat<> Committrr on tlw Judiriary, 89th
Cong., 1st SP~s., p. 14- et seq. (1965) .
. :n The Attor·npy GE:>nrml'" r<•gulation~ :d~o IIHlientr hi" vi<'ll' that § 5, like
§ 4 (a.), npplie:-: territori:dl~·: "Sf'rtion 5 .. . prohibit:; thp enforcement
.in ccny jurisdiction covered by § 4 (a) I of ally voting change]." 28 CFR
§ 51.1 (1976) . (EmplHtkii' :<npplird.)
22 Thr Attonwy Gcrwml'~ stat.f'ment" and Pxhibit,.: appri,.:ed tho Congre~
that the Attornry GrnPral h:1d t rc:1 ted eitie;,; like Shrflleld, Ala., as covered
by § 5. Sre al"o 1975 SPna1r Hearings, at 563-564 (diseu~sion of § 5
submission from Montgomery, Ala .), and 5!iR (statement of .Justice Department offirinl that t hPre wm; no need to cla.rify the Act to make certain
·that city council l'cdistricting is covered) .

..
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shared the Attomey General 's view. In 1970. Congress ·was
clearly fully aware of this Court's interpreta.tion of § 5 as
reaching voter changes other than those affecting the registration process and plainly contemplated that the Act would
continue to be so construed. See, e. g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538. and Similar Proposa.ls, 91st Cong .. 1st
··sess., 1, 4. 18. 83, 130-l31 , 133, 147-149, 154- 155. 182-184,
402-454 (1970); Hearings before Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 91st Cong .. 1st
and 2d Sess .. 48. 195- 196. 369- 370. 397- 398. 426- 427. 469
(1970). The history ful'ther suggests that Congress assumed
that, just as § 5 applies to changes that affect aspects of
voting other than registration. so it also applies to entities
other than those which coriduct voter registration. One of
the principal factual arguments advanced in favor of the
renewal of § 5 was that Anniston. Alabama-which, like Sheffield, has never cond uctecl voter registra,.tion- had failed to
obtain preclearance of some highly significant voting changes.
See Joint Views of Ten Members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee Relating to the Extension of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 116 Cong.'Rec. 55Ql ( 1970).
The congressional history is even clearer with respect to ~
the 1975 extension. which. of course. is the legislation now in
effect. Both the House and Senate Hearings on the bill reflect
that the assumption that the coverage of ~ 5 was unlimited
was widely shared and unchallenged. In addition to the
aforementioned testimony of the then Assistant Attorney
General. which of course has special significance. numerous
witnesses expressed this view. either directly or indirectly.
See. e. g., 1975 Senate Hearings, at 74-75 (in covered jurisdictions ~ 5 requires preclearauce of all voting changes. and
objections have been entered by the Attorney General at every
stage of the electoral process). 112- 113 (describing preclear~nce of chang~s in. city of Montgomery, Ala.) , 463- 464-
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(stating that if Act were applied to Texas, § 5 would require
preclearance of voting changes of cities and school districts,
neither of which register voters~"), and 568 (statement by
Justipe Department official that there is no need to clarify Act
to make certain that city council redistricting is covered by
§ 5); 1975 House Hea1·iugs. at 332 (referring to city of
Bessemer. Ala., as "covered jurisdiction'') and 631-632
(describing lengthy § 5 preclearance process for Charleston,
S. C.-a city which. like Sheffield. does not conduct
voter registration) .21 More signific;wtly. both the House and
Senate Committee Reports preclude the conclusion that § 5
was not understood to operate territorially. Not only do the
reports state that § 5 applies "[i]n [designated] jurisdictions." see S. Rep. No. 94-295. 94th Cong .. 1st Sess., p. 12
(1975) ("1975 Senate Report''); H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess .. p. 5 (1975) ("1975 House Report") (emphasis
supplied), they also announce that one benefit of the proposed extension of the Act to portions of Texas \vould be that
Texas cities a11d school districts-neither of which has ever
registered voters-would be subject to the preclearance requirement. 1975 Senate Report. at 27-28; 1975 House Report,
at 19-20. Finally. none of the opponents of the 1975 legislation took issue with the common assumption that § 5 applied
to all voting changes within covered States. lndeecl. they
apparently shared this view. Sec 121 Cong. Rec. S13072
(daily eel. July 21. 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) ("[a]ny
[voting changes] ... made in precincts, county districts,
school districts. municipalities, or state legislatures, or any
other kind of offices, halve] to be submitted to the Attorney
General"). See also 121 Cong. Rec. S13331 (daily eq. July 22,
1975) (remarks of Sen. Allen).
In short, the legislative background of the enactments and
2 a See Tex. Elec. Codo Ann., Art. 5.09
(1967); Art. 5.13a (1976)
(Vernon) .
~ 1 See S. C. Code §§ 7-5-lO, 7-5-30, 7-5-610 to 7-5-630 (1976).
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re-enactments compel the conclusion that Congress always
understood that. as the purposes of the Act and its terms
suggest. ~ 5 of the Act covers all political units within designated jurisdictions like Alabama. Accordingly. we hold that
the District Court erred in concluding that ~ 5 does not apply
to the city of Sheffield.

III
Having decided that Sheffield is subject to ~ 5, we must
consider whether the District Court properly concluded that
the Attomey General's failure to object to the holding of the
r·eferendum constitutC'd clearance under ~ ·5 of the method of
electing rity councilmen under the nC'w government. Only a
few words arc needed to demonstrate that the District Court
also erred on this point.
It bears emphasizing at the outset that the purpose of ~ 5
is to establish procedures in which voting changes can be
scrutini~ed by a federal instrumentality before they become
effective. The basic mechanism for preclearance is a declaratory judgment proceeding in the District Court for the District
of Columbia. but the Act. of course. establishes an altcmative
procedure of submission to the Attorney General to give
"covered States a rapid method of rendering new lavvs effective." Allen v. State Boar·d of Education, supra, 393 U. S ..
at 549. Under the statute's terms. the Attorney General will
be treatrd as having approV(•d a voting change if such change
has "been submitted . . . to I him] and [hel has not interposed an objection with sixty days after such submissio·n " or·
if the change has been submitted .&nd "the Attorney General
has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be
made. " 42 U. S. C. ~ 1973c. (Emphasis supplied.) See also
Georgia v. United States, supra, 411 F. S .. at 540. Whil<: the
Act does provide that inaction by tlw Attorney General may,
under certain circumstances. constitute federal preclearance of
a changC', the purposes of the Act would plainly be subverted
if the Attorney General could ever be deemed to have approved
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voting change when the proposal was neither properly
submitted nor in fact evaluated by him. But the District
Court held precisely that.
First. it is clear on this record-and the District Court did
not find otherwise-that the city of Sheffield did not. in its
March 20. 1975 letter. submit to the Attorney General a
request for preclearance of the change in the City's form of
government. Sheffield's letter sought approval only for the
holding of the referendum."'· Moreover. under the Attomey
General's own regulation. the validity of which is not ques~
tioned. the City could not at that tillle have sought preclearance of the change in the form of government because. as the
March 20. 1975 letter stated. see n. 4. supra, the details of the
change had not yet bef'n worked out. Sec 28 CFR ~ 51.7
(1976). 20
And there is no question but that the Attorney General did
not intend to approve the proposed change to a mayor-council
government and could not be understood as having done so.
When the A ttomey General wrote the City and told it that he
had decided not to interpose an objection to the holding of the
referendum. he warned that the change itself required
prior federal scrutiny. and he apprised it of the information
it should supply if it wished to attempt to preclear the change
2
thi~ ronnrction it hear~ noting that thr Attonw~· Orneral's
" Tn
regulution;,; providt' that ~uch IPtter~ ;,;hould l'IP:tl'l~ · ~et forth th<' proposed
change nfTrcting voting for· whi<·h rl<';t r·nrwr i:; being sought. Sec 28 CFR
§§ 51.5. 51.10 (a) (J97o) .
2 <: In pertinrnt part~. thi~ pro, · id<'~ " I R jrganling a chnngp a:,; to which
approval b~ · rrfrrrndum ... i~ rrquirwl . . . , the Attornr.' · GPnernl may
comdder and r::<~ue :t del'i~ion corH·Pming the change prior to thr rrferendum .. . if all othrr aetion nP<'<'"':<:tr~· for adoption h:t~ been taken .'t
Since it quitr frequrntl~· \\'ill lw 11w ca:;p that it \\'ill not be po~~ible to
determine \\'hrthrr a voting rhnng<' ha~;. thr purpo:<r or effrct of rac·inl
discrimination until the prrri~P pantmetN,.: of th<' chang<' arr known, there
is no question but that. thi~ rrgulation i~ a n'a~omtble mran~ of admini s ~
tering the Act and, :t.~ "uch, i:-- valid. Set' Georgia v. United States, supl'a,

411 U. S., a~ 538.
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in government \\"ith tlw Attorney Uenc>ral. rather than 111
federal district cow·t.
Under the circumstances. it is irreleva11t that the Attonwy
General might have been on notice that. if tlw rderendun1
passed. Shrfficld would have been requit·ed by state law to
au opt an at-largr Rystrm of councilmanic eJectioiJR. :~• A]though
the City could have easily placed the request for prf'clearance
of the change in the form of govemmpn t bcforr the A ttomey
General-i.e., by taking all action necessary for tlw con1pletion
of the change before submitting it. se<> 28 CFR ~ 5l.i (19i6).
and by stating in its letter that it desired preclearallC(' of the
change itself. sec id., ~~ 51.5. 51.10 (a )-it did not. so the
Attorney General. quite properly. treated s hc\ffief(f*as having
sought prior clearance only of the referendum. Accordingly,
the District Court erred in concluding that the .\ttorney General has to be understood as having approved tlw adoption of
an at-largr system of c}('ction.
Since we concludr that Sheffield is covrred by ~ 5 of the
Act and that the Attomey General did not clear tlw City's
decision to adopt a system of government in which councilmrn
are elected at large, the judgment of the District Court is

Reversed.

27 We ob~erYe that :If till' timP or thr Attorne~· Cenrral '~ npprontl of the
referendum, it, wa ~ l'ar l'rom rlcar that. Alnbarll:t law I'Nfuirrd that a
· mayor-council gowrnmPtlt in 8hrflic•ld mrludr an at-largp ~~ · ~tern of Plecting
councilmen . Both tlw Alnbama r\ttonw~· (iPner•tl '>< I!J(i~ opinion , sec n. 3,
supra, and the Cit _, ·'~ \l:trclt :.?0, Hli5 lettl'r, HC'(' 11 . .J . supm. ~t:lled that
Sheffield would rc•fnl'll to th(' I\Jl:2 ~~· Htem , in whi ch rouncilmen were
elected by rach of the four ward~, if the rderrndum w<'rr to fl""'"· Indeed,
the recordrrflc<'f~ that the City bad HOlllP difli<'ult~· prr,;uading the Attorney
General thnt state law <•vrn permittrd it. fo :tdopt an at large "ystem .
Thus, it, srrms that the Dt"tnet Court',; <'On('ht,;wn that the Atfomey
General muHt havr known that at-large rleetionH wrn• rrquirrd by Jaw is
ltself questionable,
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September 14, 1977

No. 76-1662 U.S. v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala.
This is a brief memorandum to record my initial
impression after having read the two opinions of the three
judge district court and the SG's brief.

As of this date,

appellee's brief has not been delivered to my Chambers.
This is the Voting Rights Act case in which a three
judge court held that Sheffield, Alabama, a city of some
13,000 populaton, is exempt from §5 of the Act because it does
not conduct its own voter registration.

In Alabama voter

registration is conducted by the counties and not by cities
such as Sheffield.
Alabama is a state designated under §4(b) as subject
to the Act, including §5 thereof.

That section requires a

covered "state or political subdivision" desiring to change
any voting procedure to obtain preclearance from the Attorney
General or from the DC in the District of Columbia.

The

phrase "a state or political subdivision" appears in several
places in the Act, and the term "political subdivision" is
defined in §14 (c) (2) as follows:

2.

(2) The term "political subdivision" shall mean
any county or parish, except that where registration
for voting is not conducted under the supervision of
a country or parish, the term shall include any other
subdivision of a State which conducts registration
for voting.
The question presented is whether, in the
circumstances of this case, the foregoing definition of
political subdivision is applicable.

If so, the SG concedes -

in effect - that the decision of the three-judge court is
correct.

The SG agrees "that Sheffield is not a 'political

subdivision' within the meaning of §14".

(Br • p. 13) •

The SG contends, however, that the term "political

j' I '-Y

subdivision" as defined i ~ ~ is relevant only in situations
when an entire state is not designated under §4(b) as covered
.......

--

._a

by the Act.

~

In other words, if only certain counties or

cities in Alabama had been designated they would have been
limited to political subdivisions which conducted their own
registration of voters.
I will not undertake here to summarize the arguments
pro and con.

If the language of the Act that appears to be

relevant is read literally (i.e. given its "plain meaning"),
the holding of the three-judge court probably is correct.

The

SG's answer is that we must look at the "structure" of the
entire Act, its original legislative history, its purpose, the
AG's consistent interpretation of it, and the presumed
congressional approval of that interpretation when the Act

3.

was extended in 1970 and again in 1975.
The SG's arguments, certainly at the policy level,
are powerful indeed.

It would not make a great deal of sense

to allow the cities in a state with registration laws like
those of Alabama to escape compliance with the Act whereas
cities located in other states that provide for registration
of voters within cities would be covered.

Certainly, it is

difficult to believe that Congress intended to allow some
cities to escape the broad net it sought to cast by the Act.
But the analysis by the three-judge court, based
almost exclusively on the language of the Act, is not without
considerable force.

I think we can be sure that the Court

will wish to sustain the overall intentions of Congress
provided we can ~
eYsta~n this from the

9?e~ali

structure of the

Act without doing manifest violence to its explicit language.
Subject to more careful examination, and to conferring with my
clerk, I

~~

am ~to

believe this can be done.

L.F.P., Jr.
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S. v. Board of Commissioners

Introduction

Despite the facial incongruity of the statute's
~

language and the interpretation urged by the SG, I think his
4

position is right.

There are no cases on this question,

except those that are pending now.

Of course, in many cases,

cities and other political units that do not conduct
registration have sought pre-clearance under

§

5 of the Voting

Rights Act; until now, their obligation to do so has been
assumed.

To some extent, Perkins v. Matthews, 400

u.s.

379,

and Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, shed light
on the question, but only obliquely.

I have not had time to

examine the legislative history myself; but Justice Blackmun's
clerk (Mike Sundermeyer) tells me that the excerpts quoted in
the briefs are representative.
I shall consider both sides' arguments in the order
in which they are presented by the SG.

The bulk of the memo

will be devoted to the question whether cities and other
non-registering political units, within covered states or
political subdivisions, are subject to the pre-clearance

..

2.

requirements of the Act.

The remainder will consider whether

the Attorney General in fact approved the voting change at
issue in this case, contrary to his contention that he did not.

II.

Interpretation of the Statute

The basic problem in this case concerns ajivergence
(recently discovered, it seems) between the purposes of the
Voting Rights Act and the language of certain of its
provisions.
§§

The critical statutory language appears in

4 (b), 5, and 14 (c) (2) of the Act.

Section 14 (c) (2) defines

"political subdivision", for purposes of the Act, as
"any county or parish, except that where
registration for voting is not conducted
under the supervision of a county or
parish, the term shall include any other
subdivision of a State which conducts
registration for voting."
Section 4(b) uses the definition of "political subdivision" in
§

14 (c) (2) to define the jurisdictions covered by the Act.

sets out the statutory coverage formula as follows:
"The prov1s1ons of subsection (a) of this
section shall apply in any State or any
political subdivision of a state which (])
the Attorney General determines maintained
on November 1, 1964, any test or device,
and with respect to which (2) the Director
of the Census determines that less than 50
per centum of the persons of voting age
residing therein were registered on
November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per
. centum of such persons voted in the
presidential election of November, 1964."

It

3.

Section 4(b) goes on to make provision for similar
determinations to be made by the Attorney General and the
Director of the Census periodically after 1964, in order to
bring other States or political subdivisions within the Act's
coverage if necessary.

Section 5 sets out the requirements

for pre-clearance of changes in voting procedures in covered
areas.

The pre-clearance procedures apply

"[w]henever a State or political
subdivision with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in [§ 4(a)] . • •
are in effect shall enact or seek to
administer any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force or
effect on November 1, 1964, [or the dates
specified in the other sentences of §
4(b)] • • .
Section 5 goes on to specify the procedures by which "such

-

State or subdivision" may effect its p...,.r oposed change in
voting practices.

(The full text of these provisions appears

in the Jurisdictional Statement at 23a-29a.)
The position of the Board of Commissioners of
Sheffield, Alabama [hereinafter "Sheffield"] is simply that
Sheffield is not a political subdivision as defined in

§

14(c) (2), because it does not conduct voter registration, and
therefore its electoral changes are not subject to
pre-clearance within the literal terms of

--

§

5.

The SG

concedes that Sheffield is not a political subdivision within
the meaning of the Act.
position, I believe the

..

Although the SG does not take the

4.
present situation is attributable, in part, to the Court's

---

expanded perception, adopted in Allen and Perkins, of the
.___. _....-.,__........._

scope of electoral changes with which Congress was concerned
when it passed the Act.

I say "in part" because even if the

Act were construed as set out in Mr. Justice Harlan's partial
dissent in Allen, the anomaly of the present situation would
exist.

See Part II. D. infra.

I conclude that the

-

incongruity between the language of the statute .and Congress'
~

probable intent not to let non-registering political units
escape the coverage of the Act (and thereby effect voting
changes that states and political subdivisions could not
effect, even in the non-registering units) is attributable to

-----

congressional oversight.

I think Congress simply assumed that

the kind of voting changes with which it was concerned, even
at the lowest levels of government, would be effected by
counties or whichever unit registered voters.

II.
A.

Statutory Interpretation

The language of the Act
Both sides have arguments based on the language of

the Act.

JV~

Sheffield's primary argument is the literal one

mentioned above:

because it does not register voters, the ~~~~

city is not a "political subdivision" under§ 14(c) (2) and
therefore is not subject to the pre-clearance requirements of
§

5.

This argument would end discussion if it were not so

.......__

I

contrary to the overall purpose of the Act and the
assumptions, until now, of Congress, the Attorney General

•·

and the political units themselves.

Sheffield's primary

argument based on the statutory language is buttressed by two
others.
First, § 5 allows a political subdivision to proceed
with implementation of its proposed electoral change by
obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for
the District of Columbia or by submitting the change to the
Attorney General.

Sheffield argues that since political

subdivisions alone are authorized to obtain pre-clearance,
there is no statutory mechanism for an entity that is not a
political subdivision to comply with § 5.

As stated by

Sheffield, it lacks "standing" to undertake the § 5 procedures
The simple answer to this point is that if the SG's
theory prevails, the literal interpretation of "political
subdivision" for purposes of compliance will fade along with
the literal interpretation for purposes of coverage.

I doubt

that the Court would hold that§ 4(b) applies to Sheffield's
proposed voting changes but that Sheffield cannot seek to
comply under § 5.

The argument is a make-weight argument.

It

supports Sheffield's view that under the literal terms of the
statute, only voting changes effected by states or political
subdivisions require pre-clearance, but it is not an argument
with independent force.

It simply points out that Congress

used terminology consistently throughout the Act.
Even if Sheffield's literal interpretation of the
"standing" requirement in § 5 were adopted, it would not be
fatal to the SG's argument.

...

It would not be unthinkable to

6.

say that the state or political subdivision of which the city
is a part would have to present the changes to the D. C.
district court or the Attorney General.

As a practical matter

this option is less desirable, in my opinion, than refusing to
construe the statute literally, but it tends to defeat
Sheffield's "standing" argument.

-

The second subordinate point, made not by Sheffield
~-

.........

but by amicus Westheimer Ind. School Dist., is that Congress
knew how to include political units other than states or
political subdivisions when it wanted to.

The amicus

contrasts the language of§ 14(c) (2) with that of 42 U.S.C. §
~ 1971, which provides:

"All citizens of the United States who are
otherwise qualified by law to vote at any
election by the people in any State,
Territory, District, County, City, Parish,
Township, School District, municipality,
or other territorial subdivision, shall be
entitled and allowed to vote at all such
elections, without distinction of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude;

"
Although this argument is not without force, I do not buy it.
Section 1971 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1970; it is not part of the same legislation as the provisions
here at issue.

Also, the concern of the Voting Rights Act was

primarily with discrimination in registration and related
activities, so there is a logical explanation for Congress'
choice of the unit that conducts registration as the relevant
statutory unit.

See Part II. D. infra.

After Allen and

7.

Perkins, however, registration is not the exclusive focus of
the Act; and, as discussed in the next paragraphs and
Part II. D., Congress may have chosen the registering unit
because registration figures were relevant for purposes of the
coverage formula.

I do not regard the difference in language

as dispositive.
The SG focuses on other language in the statute.

The

Act's protections "apply in any State or in any political
subdivision of a State" covered by
the SG) .

§

4 (b)

(emphasis added by

The SG interprets this to mean that the

{ pre-clearance requirements of

§

5 apply to any voting changes

within the contemplated scope of the statute that take place
\

at any governmental level within a covered territory.

I agree

\ with this interpretation. It flows from recognition of the
fact that when a whole state is covered, voting changes
...___...___

---though the subdivision

enacted by political subdivisions must be pre-cleared, even
~......_

--...... _,

itself is not separately designated.

The court below subscribed to this view, see J.S. 13a, and the
view is confirmed by the legislative history.
brief at 14-15.

See the SG's

If changes by a political subdivision must be

pre-cleared, even though the subdivision could be designated
separately but was not, then it makes more sense that
political units that cannot be designated separately are
covered when the whole state is covered.

This point is

corroborated by considerations subsumed under the SG's points
about the need for uniformity of coverage among states and

8.

statutory purpose:

The point is that if a whole state is

covered, it should not make any difference whether electoral
changes at the local level are enacted by the state itself or
local units to whom such power has been delegated by the state.
B.

The Need for Uniformity of Coverage
The law varies from state to state as to which

political body is empowered to effect changes in voting
practices at the local level (or, at the level of any unit
that does not conduct its own registration).

~

In Alabama

~~~~

counties conduct registration but the state has given
municipalities the authority to change election practices.
Code of Alabama, Title 37,

§

34 (Supp. 1973).

Wt.Al"-

In Georgia, on

the other hand (the state involved in the Allen litigation) ,
changes in local election laws can be made only by the state
legislature.

Code of Ga. Ann.

brief at 16 & nn. 9 & 10.
§§

§

69-1018(a) (1).

See the SG's

If a municipality is immune from

4 & 5 because it is not a political subdivision, a state

could escape the strictures of the Act by delegating election
authority to localities, thereby accomplishing without
pre-clearance what otherwise would have been subject to
pre-clearance.

§

5

!I

!/

The SG argues that its position is supported
by reference to Perkins, where the Act was applied to the city
of Canton, Mississippi, which the SG says is no more a
political subdivision than the city of Sheffield. See the
SG's brief at 17 n. 11. I believe the SG to be mistaken on
this point. The SG concedes that Canton, Miss1ss~
conductea its own voter registration. The SG attempts to
minimize the significance of this fact by pointing out that
counties in Mississippi also conduct voter registration,
(Footnote continued on next page)

~~

9.

C.

Statutory Purpose
The SG's main (and obvious) argument from the purpose

of the statute is that the Court should not adhere to a

.t-,..;l f.A.~

literal construction of the statute's language but should keep
in mind the legislation's overall purpose.

The SG cites the

Court's departure from literalism in its jurisdictional
holding in Allen, 393 U.S. at 557-60.

See SG's brief at 18-19.

But in this section of its brief the SG also suggests
,-....
1
what I view as the kost attractive way of deciding this case.
The route has been suggested implicitly and alluded to above.
The SG points out that since the source of authority for the
Voting Rights Act is the Fifteenth Amendment, which speaks in
terms of prohibition of state action to deny or abridge the
right to vote, the focus, as in Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, should be on whether particular action by a
unit of local government can and should be attributed to the
-..._......_

state.

I say that the SG has been

(Footnote 1/ continued from prev. page)
so that, since § 14(c) (2) states that political units other
than counties or parishes are considered political
subdivisions only "where registration for voting is not
conducted under the supervision of county or parish"(emphasis
added), even a city in Mississippi that conducts registration
does not qualify as a political subdivision. This is
far-fetched reasoning indeed. Congress probably was thinking
of the usual situation in which there would not be overlapping
authority to conduct registration. In a case of overlaping
registration authority, the more sensible interpretation of
§ 14 (c) (2) is that the city is a political subdivision,
because for purposes of the elections for which the city
conducts its own registration, the county in effect does not
conduct registration •

....

/' ;.,
S ~~
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building up to this, whether intentionally or not, because the
unstated assumption behind what has been said so far (in the
SG's brief and in this memo) is that local government units,
as creatures of the state, should not be allowed to do what
the state itself is prohibited from doing.

Sheffield does not

address this view, because it is only implicit in most of the
SG's brief and explicit in only two paragraphs.
19-20.

SG's brief at

But several of Sheffield's and amicus' points
~

unintentionally meet the SG's point~ on each of the~ ' the SG
has the better of the argument.
At pages 5-6 of its brief, Sheffield cites

§

2 of the

Voting Rights Act in support of its position that the Act is
directed at states and counties, not at lower levels of local
government.

Section 2 provides:

"No voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision to deny
or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race
or color."
While Sheffield has no trouble gleaning from this section the
proposition that the Act cannot apply to lower levels of
government, Sheffield never explains why it would be
consistent with the Act to allow a creature of the state to
accomplish what would be illegal if done by the state.
course, Sheffield need not go so

far~

Of

nothing in the Act

prevents private citizens or the Attorney General from suing
to enjoin the enforcement of discriminatory voting laws.

But

the prophylactic measure of

§

5 was thought necessary by

Congress because single lawsuits were perceived to be
inadequate to the task.
U.S. 301.

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383

As noted above, states could evade

§

5 by

delegating all responsibility for elections (except
registration) to local government, and the purpose lauded by
Sheffield in

§

2 would be defeated.

Amicus Westheimer Ind. School District focuses on the
parallellism of statutory language in

§

5.

Amicus argues that

the main purpose of the Act was registration, and that the
only reason counties were included in the statute (in addition
to the inclusion of legislation by the state itself) was that
Congress was concerned as much with discriminatory
administration and enforcement as with discriminatory
legislation.

Amicus justifiably identifies the state itself

with legislation and the county, or other unit conducting
registration, with administration.

Congress' "solution was

the unique definition of 'political subdivision', aimed at
attacking vices in the registration process itself."

Amicus

"call[s] the Court's attention to the
structure of the first sentence of the
section, which repeats three times the
dichotomy 'State or political subdivision
. • • enact or seek to administer.'
'State' is clearly intended to be coupled
with 'enact', so that state-wide
legislation will be covered.
'Political
subdivision' thus is linked to 'seek to
administer' so that local enforcement of
registration laws will be covered."
Westheimer brief at 21 n. 7.
observation is accurate.

As far as it goes, this

But it fails to take account of

several factual scenarios that would not conform to this
traditional model.

What of the situation in which the state

not only delegates to the county authority to administer
elections and enforce state-created rules, but also gives the
county responsibility for administration and legislation?

The

county's supervisionof registration would be irrelevant to its
authority to make or change the rules.

The power of the

Attorney General to designate a political subdivision is
irrelevant when the state is covered and delegates its
authority to the subdivision.

Similarly, when the state

delegates its legislative authority to a political unit that
does not conduct registration, the power to "enact" has passed
to that body.
it as well.

The power to "administer" probably accompanies
Should not the body with legislative power be

subject to the pre-clearance requirements of the Act?
A possible objection to this theory, easily
answerable, is that including every political unit within a
covered states makes meaningless the alternative provision for
designating a county or other political subdivision.

I think

this point is made in the Westheimer brief at 17, but it is
hard to tell.

The short answer is that the provision allowing

separate designation of counties, without designating an
entire state, allows greater refinement in application of the
Act.

If a particular county in a state has used a test or

device and had less than 50% voter registration or
participation, then it can be subjected to the Act without
affecting the rest of the State.

Thus, the possibility of

designating a unit smaller than the whole state is an
alternative to, and a less restrictive one than, state-wide
coverage.

13.

D. Legislative History
1.

Prior to passage of the Act
The legislative history cuts both ways.

On the

one hand, the legislative history indicates Congress' primary
concern with voter registration and other aspects of access to
the ballot box.

This comes out in the legislative history

cited by both sides.

Resp and amicus Westheimer emphasize

Congress' exclusive concern with those units of government
that had authority over the registration process, either
through legislative or administrative power.

A strong piece

of legislative history in resp's favor is the statement that
the definition in§ 14(c) (2)
"makes clear that the term 'political
subdivision' is not intended to encompass
precincts, election districts, or other
similar units when they are within a county
or parish which supervises registration for
voting."
Resp's brief at 11 (quoting 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2569).
The SG agrees that Congress was concerned about
registration, but adds that Congress was also concerned with
other means of discriminting against minorities in voting.
The SG says that Congress focused on political units that
conduct registration because of the coverage formula.

In

other words, Congress' concern in deciding how to determine
which areas would be covered may not have been exactly
congruent with its notions of which political units within

·.c

-
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covered areas would seek to effect covered electoral changes.
(This relates to the SG's emphasis on the words "in any State"
or "in any political subdivision".)

The SG asserts that

Congress chose to tie coverage to units that conduct
registration because as to those units the Director of the
Census could obtain valid registration statistics, in order to
determine whether registration or voter participation was
below 50%.

This is confirmed in an except from Attorney

General Katzenbach's testimony, quoted by Sheffield, in which
he said:

"I think the only way in which we can gather valid

statistics here is really -- we are aiming at voter
registration and I think the term 'political subdivision' is
used here aimed primarily at the area in which the
registration process takes place."

Sheffield brief at 13.

If the Act were construed to extend only to changes
affecting the registration process, Sheffield's position would
have greater merit.

But in Allen and Perkins, a majority of

the Court perceived Congress' intent to have been to include
other kinds of electoral practices.

In Perkins,

Mr. Justice

Breannan confirmed the accuracy of Mr. Justice Harlan's
observation, in his partial dissent in Allen, "that the
Court's holding [in Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (a
companion case to Allen)] rested on its conclusion that
'Congress intended to adopt the concept of boting articulated
in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and protect Negroes
against a dilution of their voting power.'"
400

u.s.

Perkins, supra,

390 (quoting Fairley v. Patterson, supra, 393 U.S. at

580) (opinion of Harlan, J.).

Justice Harlan's opinion in

15.
Allen and its companion cases is, as usual, n'ighly
persuasive.

He observed that the Court's citation of Reynolds

v. Simms, a decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment, is
incorrect in the context of the Voting Rights Act, which is
based squarely on the Fifteenth Amendment.

393

u.s.

at 588.

Justice Harlan viewed the purpose of the Voting Rights Act to
be limited to ensuring access to the ballot box and the ballot
not increasing minority political power.
It would be tempting to say that if the Court had
accepted Justice Harlan's conception of congressional intent,
the instant case would be easier.

If the Act was intended to

cover only abuses in creating or administering registration
requirements, it would be fairly obvious that only political
units that have authority over aspects of registration are
covered by the Act.

There would be perfect congruence between

statutory language and statutory purpose.
not that simple.

But the issue is

Justice Harlan would not have confined the

Act to instances of voter registration per se.
interpreted it to cover "the change of any

He would have
. procedure

that prevents the voter from having his ballot finally
counted . . . . "
Act.

393 U.S. at 589-90 n.

7~

see §14(c) (1) of the

Another formulation of his view, id. at 591 is:

"Section 5, then would properly be read to require federal
approval only of those state laws that change either voter
qualifications or the manner in which elections are conducted.
Justice Harlan agreed with the Court that voting
changes proposed in three of the four companion cases came
within the scope of §5.

•

He agreed that pre-clearance was

16.

required in Whitley v. Williams (new qualifications on
independent voters who wish to nominate a candidate, and
change in manner in which such nominations are

made)~

Bunton

v. Patterson (change that made the office of school
superintendent appointive rather than elective) (Justice Harlan
considered this a close question because the new voting
qualification, which in effect disqualified all voters, could
perhaps not be considered a qualification since there would be
no vote, but he concluded "on balance" that it should come
within

§5)~

and Allen itself (change in the manner of

processing illiterate voters at the polls).

It was only in

Fairley v. Patterson, which involved a state statute that
allowed counties to place their election of Boards of
Supervisors on an at-large basis, that Justice Harlan
dissented.

See 393 U.S. at 592-93.

This was because the

change from single-member district to at-large voting does not
affect the right of any voter to cast his ballot and have it
3

counted.
I have engaged in this lengthy narration of Justice
Harlan's analysis because it seems to me to clarify an

3.

Justice Harlan also registered a practical objection:
"Moreover, it is not clear to me how a court would
go about deciding whether an at-large system is to be
preferred to a district system. Under one system,
Negroes have some influence in the election of all
officers~ under the other, minority groups have more
influence in the election of fewer officers. If
courts cannot intelligently compare such
alternatives, it should not e readily inferred that
Congress has required them to undertake the task."

393

u.s. at

586

(emphasis in original) .

17.
important point about what Perkins

and Allen did not do,

insofar as they are relevant to the issue in the instant
case.

If one accepts Justice Harlan's analysis, it becomes

plain that Perkins and Allen did not turn congressional intent
to correct abuses in the registration process into a carte
blanche for federal review of all local electoral changes.
Even under Justice Harlan's analysis, the statute is not
limited to registration per se.

Thus Sheffield cannot

legitimately make the argument that Congress was concerned
only with registration and therefore sought only to subject to
pre-clearance those changes effected by the registering body
itself.

Under Alabama law, as noted above, local governments

have the authority to do the sort of thing that Justice Harlan
viewed as within the ambit of §5, such as moving polling
places, Code of Ala.,. Title 37, §34(24); see Perkins, supra;
and the kind of thing the majority held to be within the scope
of §5, such as altering district lines.
37, §34(23).

Code of Ala., Title

Many of the other aspects of local elections are

governed by state legislation in Alabama, but it is
theoretically possible that any or all of these functions
could be delegated to localities by state law.
The point is that the Court's departure from a strict
construction of the Act - which would have limited it to
changes in core registration rules (which departure was
concurred in by all but Mr. Justice Black, who in any event
continued to hold to the view expressed in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, that the whole of §5 is unconstitutional) destroyed the congruence between the coverage definition and

the substantive reach of the Act.

With that in mind, it

becomes clear that the SG wins no matter which of two possible
views one takes of the legislative history.
If one starts with Sheffield's view that Congress was
concerned only with registration and those who conduct it,
then it follows that under the broader construction of the
substantive reach of the Act (whether Mr. Justice Harlan's
ballot-access view or the broader dilution-of-minorityvoting-power view of the majority}, Congress would have been
concerned with those who effect such changes.

(The analysis

is similar to the one suggested in the bank venue case:

we

apply the underlying congressional purpose to a changed
situation, despite the narrower language chosen by Congress
when it was thinking of a narrower application of the broad
principle.}

As long as Perkins and Allen are good law, or

even if Justice Harlan's narrower view were accepted,
congressional intent - as perceived and implemented by the
Court - would be frustrated by a literal reading of the
language.
If, on the other hand, one were to view the
legislative history more favorably to the SG, his case would
be even stronger.

The SG cites items of legislative history

that indicate that Congress was thinking of electoral changes
at and by the local levels of government when it passed the
Act.

I am not sure how persuasive this evidence is, and it

seems to me that Congress' choice of definition of "political
subdivision" negates the view that it was thinking of
electoral changes by local governments.

,.

The SG quotes remarks

19.
by Senator Tallmadge, in which he explained his opposition to
the bills in terms of the effect §5 would have on all sorts of
local electoral changes.

But Sheffield points out that cities

in Georgia (the Senator's state) do conduct voter
registration.

The SG counters by asserting that in 1965,

cities and counties in Georgia shared authority to register
voters, as is the case in Mississippi, see the SG's brief at
17 n. 11, so that cities in Georgia cannot be considered
political subdivisions within the meaning of the Act.

In my

opinion, that point is as wrong

with respect to Georgia as it

is with respect to Mississippi.

See p. 8 n. 1, supra.

The SG thus finds little direct support in the
legislative history for the proposition that changes by
non-registering units are subject to

§

5.

But the legislative

history can be construed to include local elections and
electoral changes, and it was so construed in Perkins and
Allen.

To the extent that the SG's position derives as a

logical necessity from those decisions, it therefore is
well-grounded in the legislative history.

As discussed above,

the conclusion gains its support from the practical point of
view that localities should not be able to effect changes in
local elections in cases in which the state or political
subdivision of which the locality is a part could not so
legislate for the locality without pre-clearance.
2.

Subsequent developments

The SG can find much more support for his view in the
legislative history of the 1970 and 1975 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act than in the legislative history of the Act

~.

20.

itself.

Here the SG's position is irrefutable.

In the

debates on extension of the Act, both the House and Senate
reports cited voting changes by municipalities and school
districts that diluted minority voting power as examples of
practices to be remedied.

Proponents and opponents alike

assumed that changes by localities were subject to

§

5.

Debate concerned whether elections at the local level were
proper subjects of federal supervision, and the proponents of
extension of the Act obviously won.
Furthermore, submissions to the Attorney General by
local units were cited in the debates.

It is not even

necessary to give independent force, as the SG urges the Court
to do, to the Attorney General's consistent interpretation of
§

5 to include non-registering political units.

brief at 26-28.

See the SG's

It is enough to say that Congress was aware

of the Attorney' General's construction of the Act when it
extended it in 1970 and 1975.
E.

Summary
This is a hard case, because in order to rule in the

SG's favor, the Court must say that the Act means something
other than what it says.

Further, it is hard to argue in this

case that the statutory language is ambiguous on its face.

My

agreement with the SG is not based on policy considerations,
because I have no strong views about whether changes in local
electoral practices should be subject to federal
pre-clearance.

There is great force to Justice Black's views

on the matter, and I take it that you share them to some
extent.

See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545

(Powell, J., dissenting).

21.

But I am left with the feeling that Congress could
not have intended to let a state accomplish, by means of
delegation of certain responsibilities with regard to local
elections, what it could not accomplish directly without
submitting such changes for federal pre-clearance.

The only

difference between state-wide legislation dealing with local
elections and legislation by localities for themselves is the
breadth of effect of the proposed change.

The effect on

individual voters in a particular locality would be the same.
Besides, as far as I know, state legislatures need not always
adopt state-wide measures; they can legislate for particular
localities as well.
difference at all.

~I

In such cases there would be no
When I add to these thoughts the

Court's decisions in Perkins and Allen; Congress' acquiescence
in the Allen decision when it enacted the 1970 extensions of
the Act, see Georgia v. United States, supra, 411

u.s.

at 533;

and Congress' further extension of the Act in 1975 after
debates that contained references to local elections, all
factors--except the statute's literal language--point in favor
of the SG's view.
Of course, a ruling adhering to the language of the
statute would make Congress state exactly what it means, and
make its tacit acceptance of the SG's view explicit.

But an

4 The only arguable difference is that the state, not the
locality, has been designated under § 5. The local
legislature that wants to adopt the new voting requirement is
not the "culprit". But the same would be true of a political
subdivision that had not been designated separately, yet
Sheffield does not argue that a change by a political
subdivision that was not designated separately would not be
subject to pre-clearance .

•
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adoption of Sheffield's position really would be a statement
that the Court thinks Congress did not mean to reach elections
at levels of government more local than those large enough to
conduct their own registration; and I doubt that this is what
Congress meant.

My tentative recommendation on this point

therefore would be to reverse.
III.

Did the Attorney General In Fact
Approve the Voting Change at Issue?

Neither party devotes much attention to this
question.

The Attorney General did not object to the holding

of a referendum to decide whether to change from a commission
form of government to a mayor/city council form.

The Attorney

General specifically stated that further clearance would be
required for actual implementation of the change.

Sheffield

contends, and the court below held (with one judge dissenting
on this point), that the Attorney General's approval of the
referendum constituted approval of the ultimate change in the
form of Sheffield's government.
The court so held because Alabama law contains
mandatory requirements for the manner of electing council
members.

Code of Ala., Title 37,

§

426 requires, inter alia,

that members of a city council in a city of Sheffield's size
be elected at large.

(It was the election of council members

to which the Attorney General ultimately objected.)

The court

below held that since the Attorney General was charged with
knowledge of this provision of Alabama law, he knew that
at-large election of council members would be instituted if
the mayor/council form of government were adopted at the
referendum.

,;

23.

Sheffield's theory would persuade me but for two
points.

First, the letter from Sheffield to the Attorney

General, requesting pre-clearance to hold the referendum, did
not mention

§

426.

I would not imagine that the Attorney

General is held to constructive knowledge of every provision
of every state's election laws.
General was aware of

§

Second, even if the Attorney

426, there existed other information,

not in the Attorney General's possession at the time he
approved the referendum, necessary to a determination whether
to approve or object to the change.

After the referendum the

Attorney General requested and Sheffield provided various
demographic data on which the Attorney General based his
ultimate objection.

Especially considering the explicit

caveat in the Attorney General's initial letter to Sheffield,
indicating that implementing the change also would require
pre-clearance, I would not hold that he in effect approved the
change when he approved the referendum.
I am not sure why Sheffield even requested clearance
to hold the referendum.

The city leaders might have wanted to

know that the ultimate change could take place before deciding
to find out whether the people of Sheffield wanted it to take
place.

Similarly, it is conceivable that the Attorney

General's office figured it need not request and analyze the
demographic data until it was clear that Sheffield intended,
as a result of the referendum, to change its form of
government.

Each party's view (according to my speculation)

was understandable.

As a matter of fact, however, the

·'
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referendum already had taken place when the Attorney General
acted upon Sheffield's letter.

(It had not taken place when

the Attorney General received the letter.)
Given all of the above, I would not recommend
deciding the case against the SG on this ground.

N.B.
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I agree with the Court that a more sensible constJ-uction of
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose, is to
trea,t the governmental units responsible for changes iu the
electoral process within a. designated Sta.te or political subdivjsion as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision.
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding,
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State
wotJld imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In
such a situation, th~ reason for including the political subdivisions is not that they are defined in § 14 (c)(2) aod therefore might have been d~signated separately. Their eligibility
for designation apart from the State is without significance
once the entire State has been designated. ' Rather, the political subdlvisions are covered because they are within the jurisdiction of the designated unit and might be delegated its
authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting.
Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the
meaning of§ 14 (c)(2), I agree with the Court that it too~
subject to § 5 and must colT).ply with its requirements.
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effected by the 1968 law are not necessarily discriminatory, and .1~
they might have been enacted for perfectly good reasons.
The~
se ~
are matters t~~ only can be determined by clearing the law thr
h
§5 procedures. ,
,
~
Bu t t he DC's order, which simply enjoined enforcement of
the 1968 law until it is cleared through §5, did not go quite
far enough, beca'Use it "did not direct any affirmative steps to
achieve compliance with" §5. Therefore, the SG submits:
"[T]he district court should be directed to enter an order
allowing the appellees a short specific time period - we
suggest 30 days - within which to apply, by one procedure
or the other, for clearance of the 1968 change under Section 5.
If the change is cleared, no further action would be required.
If it is not cleared, appellants should then be permitted to
renew their request for election of all three members at the
same time." Br. for U.S. at 8.
Discussion: As I understand the DC injunction, the election
for Post 3 that is scheduled for this year cannot take place until
the 1968 law has beep cleared through §5. Thus, there already is
some pressure on the county to clear the 1968 law. It is unclear
what would happen if the 1968 law is not cleared and the 1978 election
is not held. The incumbant of Post 3 might just remain in office,
in which case any discriminatory effects resulting from the 1968
law could continue indefinitely. This may be what the SG is concerned
about. In order to alleviate that concern, it may be appropriate
to adopt the SG's recommended dispos~:ion.
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Although my reservations as to 't he constitutionality of the
Act haye uot abated.* I believe today's decision to be correct
under this Court's precedents and necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act. as construed in Allen and
Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense
to limit the preclearance requirement to political units charged
with voter registration. As the majority observes, ante, at 13,
such ~ construction of the statute could enable covered States
or political subdivisions to allow . local entities that do not
I
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My reservations relnte not to thr commf'Jldable purposr of the Act but
to its ~<elective coverage of certain Stn,tr,.; only and to the intrusive preclen.ranr_e procedure.
I agrer with much of what Mtt . .Tu~'l'ICE S·mvJ,NK ~a.yH in di~:sent, but.
unlr~s the Court i,; willing to overrule Allen and it~ progrny-a ::;tt>p it ha~
rrfruinrd from taking-! view those drri;;ion:; a::; fore::;lwdowing if nclt
(•ompelling tlw Court ',; judgment. today . 1 neverthrlt>::;:s rrcord my totaY
ngreemrnt witl1 :Mn. Juwi'JCt: S·mv~;Ns' view of the Act':s precleHnmce
l'f'f{ttirement, po&t, at 1-2.

'76-1662-CONCUR (A)
2

UNITED STATES v. SHEFFIELD BOARD OF COMM'RS

conduct voter registration to assume responsibility for changing the electoral process. A covered State or political subdivision thereby could achieve through its instrumentalities
what it could not do itself without preclearance.
I agree with the Court that a more sensible construction of
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose, is to
treat the governmental units responsible for changes in the
electoral process within a designated State or political sub . .
division as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision.
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding,
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State
would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In
such a situation. the reason for including the political subdivisions is not that they are defined in§ 14 (c) (2) 'and therefore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility
for designation apart from the State is without significance
once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the political subdivisions are covered because they are within the jurisdiction of the designated unit and might be delegated its
at~thority to enact or administer laws affecting voting.
l3ecause the same is true of a governmental unit like the city
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the
meaning of § 14 (c) (2), I agree with the Court that it too is
subject to § 5 and must compl,y with its requirements.
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